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Posing the research question 
Tanzania has for some reason always been an important partner in development cooperation for the 
Netherlands. The African country has always followed its own peculiar development path, being 
ruled by the same socialist president for over 20 years. Despite the fact that Tanzania was ruled as a 
one party state, for some reason the way the country was governed seemed to have had some sort 
of significant appeal to the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs. The atypical way of governance and the 
unique economic and demographic policy that was executed led to the country developing 
differently than other neighbouring states. The Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs appreciated the 
countries genuine efforts to combat poverty, a belief that was also shared by many international 
donors of development aid. The governments approach led to the most of the countries labourers 
being subsistence farmers or working in public service. Tanzania may have been what came closest to 
building a social-democratic state in Africa, based on a rural society. As of now however, Tanzania is 
urbanising very quickly, as urbanization rates lie about 5.6% a year.1 This places Tanzania among the 
fasted urbanising countries in the world.2 Tanzania’s biggest city, Dar es Salaam is currently one of 
the fastest growing cities in the world, and many rural Tanzanians are leaving their agricultural lives 
as fast as possible. It is predicted that Dar es Salaam by itself will have more than 76 million residents 
in 80 years. 30 years ago, however, no one could have expected that this East-African country would 
have these enormous urbanization rates that they have at this time. Around 1978, 15.1 million of 
17.5 million residents still lived in rural areas.3 The president in those days, Julius Nyerere, presented 
his economic plans for the society in 1967, in a document called the Arusha Declaration. These 
economic plans were part of his vision for the society as a whole, an African variant of socialism he 
named Ujamaa. This in short meant people would surrender or sell their individual private land 
possessions to the state which could then use the available labor, land and capital to provide 
adequate food and economic purpose for all Tanzanian citizens. Practically Nyerere realised that this 
would be a long process that Tanzanians needed to agree to as well. He emphasized how vital 
nationwide agreement with the plans and cooperation was to bring this ideology to success. The loss 
of individual freedom would be made up for by financial and economic security. This seems like 
classic socialism, but the Tanzanian system did differ from the orthodox variant in certain ways. The 
‘African’ element Nyerere added to the political ideology was that the ‘classical community of an 
African rural village’ would be the cornerstone of economic production. Much more than achieving 
growth, stability and prosperity for all villages would become the goal. Every village would have 
shared task and would contribute to society. This way of organising made efforts to modernise rural 
communities easier, because valuable technological resources could be shared among the villages 
making them available for more citizens at the time. This also meant that since these resources could 
be used by multiple villagers, it would greatly contribute to increasing a village’s production as a 
whole. Meanwhile government reforms in agriculture could be executed if the farmers were 
regrouped in the fixed villages.4 Every village would also use their labor force to produce one type or 
a few types of crops or products, granting the government more control on what areas to use for the 
production of certain goods. Nyerere believed that the shared responsibility and teamwork in the 
villages, and the specialization of economic activity for the villages would provide the necessary 
production to be able to give every Tanzanian a good and healthy living situation.  
Because these villages sometimes did not exist initially they often had to be created from scratch. 
That is why Nyerere’s government encouraged and later ordered groups of Tanzanians to migrate to 
these created villages. However, good intentions aside, food production, economic growth and 
                                                          
1 Cia World Factbook, Africa: Tanzania (10-11-2016) <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-
factbook/geos/tz.html>, visited on 06-08-2017. 
2 United Nations: Department of Economic and Social Affairs, World Urbanization Projects (NY: New York), 24.  
3 Robert Potter, Urbanisation and Planning in the Third World: Spatial Perceptions and Public Participation 
(Abingdon 1985), 8. 
4 Henry Bienen, Tanzania, Party transformation and economic development (NJ: Princeton 1967), 337. 
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overall prosperity plummeted under his rule. It is clear that these efforts to deurbanize and focus on 
development of rural areas have not been good for the economic production and living standard of 
Tanzanians in general.5 On first sight nevertheless, it was not a strange idea to move citizens into 
small conglomerations. It would make the government able to provide social services in rural areas in 
a more convenient and efficient way. Therefore, looking into how exactly the villagization worked 
out for the economy and how Nyerere was assisted in executing his plans would add something new 
in the field of research. Moreover, Ujamaa was created as a means of showcasing a distinct political 
and thereby economic identity. Some background information on why Tanzania chose this approach 
in the international context is therefore necessary to paint a cohesive picture of this ideology. To do 
this, the first chapter of this thesis is designated to explaining how and especially why Tanzania’s 
Ujamaa policy was designed and executed. Simultaneously Tanzania’s efforts to combat poverty and 
prominent presence on the international stage, defending the interests of former colonies, have 
always attracted foreign donors and enabled the reception of a lot of aid. It is also interesting to 
investigate how the changes and their effects on the Tanzanian economy were received in other 
states. Seeing how much of a favourable position Tanzania had compared to other African states for 
the Dutch ministry, it would be insightful to find out to what extent the international community and 
specifically the Netherlands reacted to the changes in Tanzania under Nyerere’s rule. Research has 
been done about the effects of various elements of Ujamaa on the Tanzanian state.6 This thesis 
would however add something new to the table in the sense that it focusses on how the economic 
system has influenced Tanzania’s international relations. After an introductory part explaining the 
idea of Ujamaa and how it was put to practice, the results of said ideology will be investigated further 
in the second part of the thesis. The way in which one of Tanzania’s most important donors worked 
with and responded to the Ujamaa policies that were instated, can be exemplary for how Western 
states perceived Nyerere’s plans, and what upset them about his politics in the end. Did the 
economic problems that followed the Ujamaa plans influence the relationship with these countries? 
Did they try to work and cooperate alongside the Tanzanian government or did they let him continue 
his experiment as long as stability was ensured? Did the Dutch state care so much for Tanzania 
because they believed in Ujamaa, or at least parts of it? These questions will be looked into in the 
second part of the thesis. Combining these two aspects, the main research question that will be 
answered is ‘How did the Netherlands react to the economic effects of Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa 
policy?’ 
To answer this main question in a structured way, I divided the thesis in three sub questions and 
consequently three chapters in which the questions will be answered. The first sub question is ‘What 
was Ujamaa and why was it instated?’ This chapter will showcase primary sources like documented 
speeches by Nyerere to closely examine and explain his economic and political plans, and to link this 
to his thoughts on urbanization and city planning. Thereby the chapter will explain how the 
Tanzanian government attempted to meet these goals, and how this worked out in practice for the 
nation and its economy. Finally, special attention will be given to as why the Tanzanian government 
chose for this specific approach in the international context. My assumption is that failure to execute 
these plans properly, caused a decline in national production and economic revenue, which lead to 
the nation relying on foreign aid to supplement the deficits. Tanzania would not want to adapt these 
plans, even if it would affect their international relations in a negative way, because the countries 
international image and identity was determined by the Ujamaa ideology. After this introductory 
                                                          
5 Sven Rydenfelt, ‘Lessons from Socialist Tanzania by How socialism destroyed the Tanzanian economy, The 
Freeman, 12 (1986), 349-351, 350. 
6Cranford Pratt, ‘Julius Nyerere: Reflections on the Legacy of his Socialism’, Canadian Journal of African Studies 
33:1 (1999), 137–152. 
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chapter, the second part of the thesis starts with finding out how and why the relationship between 
the Netherlands and Tanzania came to be and how the Dutch aid policy was influenced by political, 
demographic and economic changes in Tanzania. Also, this will be compared to the international 
reception that Nyerere’s Ujamaa saw in general. By doing so the second sub question ‘What was the 
reception of Ujamaa internationally, and how did it affect the relationship between the Netherlands 
and Tanzania?’ will be answered. The third and last sub question will dive into more depth on the 
latter part of the second sub question. For this chapter the response of the Dutch newspapers and 
the ministry of foreign affairs will be examined to portray a coherent overview of the reception of 
Nyereres politics and economic strategies. For this the mention of Ujamaa and the accompanying 
deurbanization in Tanzania in newspapers is examined, thereby checking how often and in what 
fashion and wordings they report on it in general. This will be accompanied by research on the 
reception of Ujamaa by the Dutch ministry of foreign affairs. The national archive in The Hague has 
saved a lot of correspondence between the ministry and the Dutch embassy in Tanzania, and it 
would be interesting to see how much interest the ministry of Foreign Affairs showed in said 
embassy, especially in regard to Tanzania’s distinct policies. Did they communicate often with the 
ambassador, did he update the ministry regularly and was he listened to? With this information the 
final sub question: ‘In what way does the correspondence between the Dutch ministry of Foreign 
Affairs and the embassy in Tanzania and the way Dutch newspapers reported on the consequences 
of the Ujamaa policy represent the Dutch reaction to the Tanzanian policies?’ will be answered. 
Combining the conclusions from these primary sources will give a clear view on the Dutch 
government’s stance on Ujamaa and its policies, and will overall show how and to what extent the 
changes that occurred because of Nyerere’s deurbanization were received in the Netherlands. This 
thesis as a whole will then offer more insight in the true reception and appreciation of Ujamaa 
politics in European donor states in general.  
Before starting to answer the first question, it is useful to showcase some of the important works 
that have been written on Tanzania and Ujamaa in general. Doing this serves several purposes. First 
of all, this is done to be able to place this thesis in the light of what’s already been written on the 
subject. In that sense, it becomes clearer what new approaches this thesis has to offer compared to 
what’s been written. At the same time, referencing the merits of other works enables the focus of 
this thesis to be on the actual research. Luckily, Belgian historian Robin van Besien has already 
created a vast bibliography of Tanzanian sources on the nation’s history.7 He created an overview of 
all the books on the history of Tanzania that were written for the university of Dar es Salam. He 
however warns about the ‘Dar es Salam school of writing’, which meant that a lot of the books were 
written as a tool to shape the nation’s political history, and were therefore heavily biased. Moreover, 
these books were however either not written on Ujamaa or avidly supporting it. For this research, it 
is vital that secondary sources are critical and objective. In this light, one of the most renowned 
writers on the subject of Ujamaa is the Swedish Africanist, Göran Hyden, who wrote multiple books 
on Ujamaa in Tanzania.8 He has written about the economic results of Ujamaa in general. Michael 
Jennings also wrote an influential book on the history of Tanzania and its cooperation with NGO’s 
regarding the Ujamaa policies.9 In a broader sense, John Iliffe, an expert on African history wrote a 
famous book called A Modern History of Tanganyika.10 This book was very thorough, but has the 
negative aspect that it was written in 1979, when Tanzania was still under Nyerere’s rule, as are most 
                                                          
7 Robin Vanbesien, De historiografie van het departement Geschiedenis te Dar es Salaam (1964-1980): een 
antropologische situering (Gent 2001). 
8 Göran Hydén, and Rwekaza Mukandala, Agencies in Foreign Aid: Comparing China, Sweden and the United 
States in Tanzania 1965-1995 (London 1999). 
9 Michael Jennings, Surrogates of the State: NGOs, Development, and Ujamaa in Tanzania (VA: Sterling 2008). 
10 John Iliffe, A Modern History of Tanganyika (Cambridge 1979). 
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of the bigger works on the nation’s history. Nevertheless, there are multiple books on the general 
history of Tanzania. However, in the grand bibliography a lot of research can still be done. Literature 
on the influence of Ujamaa on Tanzania’s foreign relations is scarce, let alone the history of the 
relation between the Netherlands and Tanzania which has no literature. Also, while many articles 
address either the fact that Tanzania partook in forceful villagization or that African socialism was 
bad for Tanzania’s economy, but how the first had its effect on the latter is almost never explained. I 
feel that by writing this thesis and researching the question I can dive into both gaps at once and add 
onto the bibliography on Tanzania’s economic and political history. Especially the research on 
primary sources in the third and fourth question will provide some findings that have not been done 
before. The thesis will therefore prove to be a welcome addition to what has been written on the 
subject thus far. 
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1. Building the blueprint for Ujamaa 
1.1 Brief history of Tanzania 
Before Tanganyika and the island of Zanzibar became independent, the mainland had been colonized 
by the Germans and afterwards, it became a British protectorate. Zanzibar had been a settling site 
for Arab traders (for the sultanate of Oman) and a trading port for Portuguese colonists. Hence, the 
colonial period had had its impact on the way the united Tanzania was to be governed after the 
departure of the colonial power. Existing institutions, structures and buildings remained in function 
after independence. Towns and cities had neighbourhoods of houses that were specifically built for 
European colonists that occupied them for years. Prior to Nyerere’s economic and demographic 
policies, the British had already given a head start for the plans that would follow.11 In terms of 
economic policy and geographical planning, the British had built a system of specialised production in 
certain areas and roads as connecting arteries that they left behind for Tanzania to further build and 
expend upon. Tanzania has always been an area with a very small urban population. The biggest hub 
was Dar es Salam, and aside from that city the country was especially unurbanized. Because of this 
many cities and towns had been created with a specific economic purpose, for example the port of 
Bagamoyo or the city of Kigoma, which was home to Central Africa’s oldest train station and 
therefore vital for transportation.12 An economic system where certain areas specialised in 
transporting or producing certain goods, services, food or cash crops was already established before 
the Tanzanian independence. Therefore, the practice of Ujamaa was in a way, a more advanced 
expansion of this system. This was implemented to a much larger extent by the Tanzanian 
government after the Arusha Declaration. Geographical planning had also been done by the German 
colonisers and the British. This was a process which really took off around the 1920’s.13 In 1956 a law 
titled "Town and Country Planning" was enacted. This principal legislation became the chapter 378 of 
the national laws.14 In short, the law provided procedures for making plans, the contents of planning 
schemes, duties and powers of various organs of the government in urban planning matters.15 The 
law first of all and most importantly restricted the free use of land. This meant that all land ideally 
had to be owned by some party. It established the possession of patches of land to either private 
owners or the Tanzanian state. This was not only an establishment of a legislative or government 
organ monitoring private property (land), but it also tried to combat individuals obtaining a 
disproportionate part of the available arable and by force, influence or power. This would prove to 
be a setup for the more extreme legislature around land property by the Tanzanian government as 
they continued their efforts to own all the land in the country, allowing them to decide who to lend 
the land to. Secondly it increased the amount of authority the government had to provide for its 
citizens in the settlements. It also protected rights of the indigenous people and tribes over land and 
provides opportunities to participate in the planning process of their areas. It would become 
somewhat of a guiding line for urban planning in the years to come for the Tanzanian government, as 
this provided a solid base of legislative structures to use after independence. It was also amended in 
1960 and revised again in 1961 to be the best fit possible for the country.16 
                                                          
11 J. Clagett Taylor, The political development of Tanganyika (London 1963), 125-168. 
12 Joe L. P. Lugalla, ‘Conflicts and Politics in Urban Planning in Tanzania’, African Study Monographs 9:4 (1989), 
181-190, 181. 
13 Idem, 182. 
14 Idem. 
15 Idem, 183. 
16 Ibidem. 
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1.2 The significance of Ujamaa for Tanzania 
After being a government minister under British rule over the country for a year, the son of a town 
chief, Julius Nyerere obtained power in Tanzania as prime minister.17 He had founded a political party 
called Tanganyika African National Union (TANU) in 1954 that mainly strived for Tanganyika’s 
independence and political sovereignty. Four years later the TANU party won 28 out of 30 seats in 
the 1958 election for the legislative council. After being elected Nyerere continued his efforts to 
strive for independence until Tanganyika was given autonomy as an independent state. Nyerere 
however shocked the Western world and the former colonisers after becoming president by 
adopting a form of socialism. Nyerere’s ideology of Ujamaa was however quite different in many 
ways from Soviet socialism. First of all, this was very evident in the foreign policy adopted by 
Tanzania. Whilst other countries deliberately sought out ties with either the Soviet Union (for 
example Congo and Ethiopia) or the United States (for example Ghana after Nkrumah and Liberia) for 
economic and military support, Tanzania meant to remain unaligned and self-supporting, striving to 
remain independent from foreign investment or humanitarian aid. In practice, the state did have ties 
with China (which for example built railroads in Tanzania) and received Western aid, but on paper, 
the plan was to maintain political neutrality. The state did not oppose the idea of development aid at 
all, since it made use of it throughout Nyerere’s complete ruling period, but it was vital that the 
conditions that donors proposed should theoretically never undermine the principles of Ujamaa. 
Most socialist countries would also at least establish strong ties with the Soviet Union, adopting their 
policies and receiving technologic support, but Tanzania refrained from doing so. Instead Tanzania 
strived to have friendly relations with both the ‘first’ and ‘second’ world. This was to set an example 
of a truly independent African country with own values, something Nyerere found very important, 
given his speeches.18 Many African states had goals of non-alignment, but ended up being very 
dependent.19 Tanzania actively tried to prevent this, at least according to the speeches bundled in 
the Arusha Declaration, to set out an example for all independent African nations. This adamant 
stance on the matter is an important component of the essence of Ujamaa itself. Classical Marxism is 
based on the battle of the classes.20 In a capitalist society, an upper class would exploit the laborers 
until a critical point is reached where the ‘proletariat’ unites and overthrows the elite.21 In Tanzania’s 
traditional society these clear economic ‘classes’ were absent. Instead, the very principle of 
colonialism fulfilled this role. Whilst simultaneously aiming to prevent exploitation and the creation 
of economic classes, the socialist ideas were mainly directed at colonial structures and institutes.22 
Dismantling these structures was necessary to give the African nation a fresh start and a chance to 
showcase a national and possibly pan-African identity.23 In his speeches Nyerere voiced that he found 
that the world was divided in two groups of countries. On one side you had nations that were either 
imperialist/neo-colonialist, racist states, or puppet nations. Nyerere believed that these states had in 
common that they were all either capitalist or victim of that system. On the other side was of course 
Tanzania which was not aligned, and therefore Nyerere seeked support from other ‘revolutionary’ 
                                                          
17 Paul K. Bjerk, Building a Peaceful Nation: Julius Nyerere and the Establishment of Sovereignty in Tanzania, 
1960-1964 (NY: New York 2015), 39. 
18 Julius K. Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism Uhuru na Ujamaa: A Selection From Writings and Speeches 1965-
1967 (London 1968), 25-28. 
19 J. H. Konter, Ujamaa: De Ontwikkeling van een Afrikaans Socialisme (Assen 1978), 49. 
20 Robert Gildea, "1848 in European Collective Memory," in Evans and Strandmann, ed. The Revolutions in 
Europe 1848–1849, (Oxford 2002), 207–235. 
21 Ibidem. 
22 Konter, Ujamaa, 36-38. 
23 Ibidem. 
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nations in South America and in Africa itself.24 In this way instating Ujamaa served both political and 
economic purposes. 
Before Nyerere voiced his economic plans and publicly announced his idea of Ujamaa, he was already 
convinced that Tanzania was in need of a political identity. From the start the country took bold 
stances on many international issues, even on controversial topics. The first act of this was Nyerere’s 
decision to make Tanzania leave the commonwealth because of the existence of apartheid laws in 
South Africa as early as 1961.25 Tanzania thereby rejected association with the EEC on similar 
grounds.26 Nyerere wanted to redefine the existing treaties with Britain as a newly independent 
nation, against the wishes and interests of the European country. Even when Britain started lowering 
the amount of aid given, Nyerere did not give in, as was part of his doctrine. In 1963 Tanganyika went 
a step further and started to boycott South Africa completely. They later took a similar stance on 
Rhodesia, and besides that, the government called out to revolutionary anti-colonist movements in 
other African states and suggested that former French colonies should try to cut their ties with 
France too.27 About this topic, Nyerere stated in a speech that his country had to follow three main 
policies regarding other African states. Firstly, the TANU party had to put effort into making all 
African parties cooperate towards a shared goal of the liberation of the African continent. Then, 
secondly, steps had to be taken to establish African unity in the continent, and finally on a broader 
scale, all Tanzanians had to work tirelessly toward achieving a situation of world peace and 
worldwide security.28 To establish its international identity, Tanzania also started stating opinions on 
topics outside of the African continent. Tanzania tried meddling in the Dutch-Indonesian conflict 
regarding the safety of New-Guineans after decolonisation. As one of the most prominent members 
of the so called front line states, an organisation of initially decolonised states that agreed to 
theoretically not align with either side in the cold war, the nation had a strong feeling of 
responsibility to try to voice an opinion on these matters, as it provided purpose and national pride 
for the country. A final example of to what extents Tanzania would go to remain non-aligned, was 
the diplomatic issue with East- and West Germany. West Germany threatened to cut its aid flow to 
Tanzania after the latter nation allowed East Germany to have diplomatic ties with it. West Germany 
retreated all its military support to Tanzania as a result as well. Despite the possible problems that 
this could have caused, Nyerere stood his ground and did not re-evaluate his stance, even though it 
had no visible economic benefits to do so.29 Instead, Nyerere expressed that ‘Any nation that tries to 
buy our vote in the UN will quarrel with us and if any nation wants to use aid as a base to interfere in 
our affairs we shall refuse said aid.’30 Thus, it is apparent that the political aspect of Ujamaa often 
weighed more than the potential financial benefits that the nation could have gotten. The 
combination of non-alignment and thereby establishing a distinct economic approach put Tanzania in 
an unpredictable and pragmatic position on the international stage, as Nyerere envisioned. In other 
words, the uniqueness of African and Tanzanian socialism and the structures it challenged were used 
as a way to establish a national identity inside the country’s borders and on the international stage. 
Nyerere’s socialism therefore did not only embody ideas on what life inside Tanzania should look 
like, but also what image the state should portray to the outside world. Furthermore, the key 
element of his approach was the emphasis on the values of Tanzanian agricultural and small-town 
                                                          
24 Abraham P. Robinson, Rural development in Tanzania : a review of Ujamaa, (DC: Washington 1974), 6. 
25 Timothy C. Niblock, ‘Tanzanian Foreign Policy: An Analysis’, African Review 1:2 (1971), 91-101, 92. 
26 Ibidem. 
27 Ibidem. 
28 Christos A. Frangonikolopoulos, ‘Tanzanian Foreign Policy: The Proportions of Autonomy’, The Round Table 
307 (1988), 276-292, 276. 
29 Ibidem. 
30 Frangonikolopoulos, ‘Tanzanian Foreign Policy’, 277-278. 
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life. The implementation of his ideas meant that many villages of at least 250 households (going up 
to several thousands of people in a single village or town) had to be built or created.31 Land was not 
property for the individual, but rather the government would assign it to each village which had a 
common responsibility in their own production and which should enable each village to have a 
certain autonomy in the governing system, having a say in decisions about the layout of their village. 
This proposed some major problems from the get-go. Patches of land had to be purchased back from 
individual African owners, foreign investors and so on. This was a pricey procedure, and very hard to 
execute correctly, even with the help of the ‘Town and country planning’ law fundaments, this 
proved to be a problem. Private property rights had just been installed throughout the country in the 
prior years and were now removed again for the greater good. Capital was taken or bought by the 
government and was thereby removed from the population, reducing the possibilities for private 
investment by individuals. Nyerere however did not consider this as a problem at all. Stability and 
shared goals by communities would remove the need for personal gains and it would turn out to be 
beneficial to all in the long run. The desire to own more money than someone else was something 
Nyerere frowned upon in general.32 Private corporations would only lead to unfair competition, and 
would be detrimental to the well-being of the country.33 Because Nyerere believed it was embedded 
in the human nature, everyone would come to accept that this way was best for the entire 
population.34 
1.3 Ujamaa and Arusha 
Nyerere expressed his views in speeches and writings, which he also bundled and published in books. 
The Arusha speeches which I referred to before, held in 1965 and 1967 were the main sources to see 
the results Nyerere wanted to achieve. He rarely goes into depth about numbers and statistics before 
1970 because he tried to use the first period to crystallise the principles of Ujamaa and to see a 
common appreciation of the ideas, plus a population that actively wants to carry out these ideas. The 
people of Tanzania would surrender or sell their land possessions to the state voluntarily and it 
would redistribute it among the villages, creating prosperity for all residents in the process. The 
power from the government to do so would be justified by vote of the people.35 The president 
believed that everyone would at some point see the benefits of this approach, and that therefore 
confrontations and force would not be necessary. Unfortunately the voluntary process was not as 
successful as Nyerere hoped, and toward the 1970’s hopes for voluntary migration were slowly 
replaced by a system of attraction by reward, then holding back government services and 
punishments, and in the worst case in the end outright forceful migration. The latter tactics were not 
beneficial for the morale of the affected people, and it hampered progress and production and also 
complicated the execution of the process as a whole. As described briefly in the introduction, the 
functioning of Nyerere’s Ujamaa system was dependent on the support and the labor of Tanzanians 
living in rural community villages. This explicit bias toward rural areas and the emphasis on both 
socialist and Christian values of cooperation and equality aligned with the very negative ideas 
Nyerere had about city life and all the dangers that come with it. According to him, cities were filled 
with businesses that were making money by outcompeting others. Nyerere believed that living 
conditions were often worse in and around cities. He stated that people in urban areas earn lower 
wages and most importantly could not depend on the community to help them in times of need. This 
was remarkable because usually wages are higher in the cities, hence explaining why so many 
                                                          
31 Potter, Urbanisation and Planning in the Third World, 12. 
32 Jennings, Surrogates of the State, 45. 
33 Ibidem. 
34 Idem, 45-46. 
35 Nyerere, Freedom and Socialism, 5-7. 
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countries saw high urbanisation rates. Though, Nyerere may have meant that the uncertainty of 
living on a wage instead of providing own food was potentially dangerous. Tanzanians that could not 
find a job whilst living in an urban area, were evidently worse off than their rural countrymates, 
because they had no source of income or food whatsoever, according to the president. Those who 
live in these situations are prone to become victims of exploitation, health issues, addiction, or fall 
for a criminal or sinful life in general.36 Nyerere also sought to scale back the valorization of 
aspirations to urban modernity because the city swelled with migrants from the countryside and 
grew at a rate that far outpaced urban planning and infrastructure.37 To combat migration to the 
cities, the government encouraged the occupation of land that was unauthorized up until that point. 
This was because the Arusha Declaration was a policy geared towards equality and equity through 
eradicating exploitive tendencies in land tenure and holdings. The declaration contained an 
important contradiction regarding its policy. When people could not be housed in Ujamaa villages 
yet, they were encouraged to reside on unauthorized land, possibly because of its temporary nature, 
making it easy to move them again. This policy was instated to stop Tanzanians from becoming poor 
city dwellers, or landless laborers as both cases could lead to possible exploitation by others. In 
practice, many Tanzanians moved to the unauthorized outskirts of Dar es Salam. The temporary 
migration to the outskirts of the city would keep the landless Tanzanians from being forced into 
labor, until an Ujamaa village is built where they could reside. Although this may sound logical it had 
an immediate reverse effect on what the government tried to accomplish. It caused Tanzanians to 
migrate to the area surrounding the city in great numbers and build their own housing there. This 
caused reluctance to leave those places in the long term, and added to the existing idea that Dar es 
Salaam was a city of dreams, increasing its pull-factor on the rural population. This was difficult for 
the government because its policy ended up causing long term problems by making the city grow. On 
top of that, the Tanzanians living in the outskirts could not profit from the possible economic benefits 
of actually living in the city, whilst also clashing government officials, causing an increase in the urban 
population in spite of government efforts.38  
1.4 The ‘problem’ called Dar es Salam 
It is important to find other reasons why Tanzania’s cities were able to grow in spite of a government 
that was trying to stop this. To do this, reasons for urbanization in Tanzania must be examined, 
looking from the perspective of the citizens. Josef Gugler and William G. Flanagan believe that 
colonization has been a major influence on later urbanization in Africa after independence.39 They 
explain that colonial hubs and city centers often faced a big shortage in available workers, as 
demands for employees far exceeded the supply. To solve this, wages were purposely raised in the 
cities to lure in rural based workers.40 Nyerere and his government reversed these benefits of city life 
quickly by trying to move economic activity away from the former capital Dar es Salaam after 
decolonization. They decentralized by moving business and government buildings and services to 
other places. Despite these efforts they were not able to stop the migration flow from rural to urban 
areas. Moreover, the system of taxation that was necessary to pay for the expenses of government 
service in the Ujamaa system proved to be a burden on the citizens. A system of taxation was already 
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created under colonial rule, but was expanded upon by the Tanzanian government. In order to pay 
taxes, citizens needed to have some form of convertible capital. Taxes had to be collected in sums of 
economic currency, so it became untenable to have a lifestyle where no money was involved. People 
had to switch to jobs that gave them paychecks in order to pay the taxes correctly. In colonial times 
this lead to a migration to the city where, as said before, wages were higher and where the labor was 
rewarded with money. After Tanzania’s independence, this process continued to have an impact.41 In 
Tanzania, Dar es Salaam was considered to be the city of bongo (Swahili for brains), the place where 
the smart ones go to “make it”.42 The attraction of building a life in the city could not be removed by 
government efforts, as there were still multiple factors that caused the migration towards this city 
and the outskirts of it. The peri-urban area around the city can potentially offer a lower cost of living 
and provide social networks, that could help young migrants to integrate into actual urban life and in 
time gradually access housing, employment, services and other resources.43 The outskirts of the city 
were therefore seen as a stepping stone to having a prolonged city life and having all the benefits 
that came with it. However, as cities expand they tend to push the poor further away from the center 
where jobs and services are available. The newcomers are pushed to the margins of its fabric, 
effectively excluding them from employment and other opportunities.44 The expectations that young 
migrants carry with them when they leave their village homes do not always match the reality they 
experience, when migration may represent a change of location, not of circumstances.45 The problem 
in Tanzania for these migrants was however that the government tried to remove social services 
from the city to rural areas. The poorest city dwellers were as result stuck between being drawn to a 
place that in real life gives no economic opportunity, and a government ineffectively trying to 
discourage this migration by shutting down their government duties inside and around the city as 
well. Urban settlers were however adamant in their decision and were reluctant to move again. Dar 
es Salaam continued to grow throughout the ages of Nyerere’s rule, but also afterward. Some 
sources even report an alarming rate of growth, heavily influencing the ways in which the necessary 
services could be provided.46 The sole growth of Dar es Salaam was enough to distort numbers on 
urbanization, being the main cause of the urbanization rate rising despite the government policy 
actively trying to change this. The poverty for the city dwellers was unfortunately increasing in the 
process. Economic disparity is compounded by unequal access to basic services and employment 
opportunities. Poor education and few vocational opportunities help to trap these poor urban 
dwellers and their children into a cycle of poverty.47 The question is how this seemingly contradictory 
situation could occur in Tanzania. Harris and Todaro argue that the main reason for 
(over)urbanization are wage distorting government interventions in inflate the wages of the few city 
dwellers, raising expectations of the masses.48 They believe that restriction of mobility and 
governmental efforts to keep the wages balanced would solve this problem.49 However the 
Tanzanian state made efforts to resolve the urbanization problem in this exact matter, and still faced 
high urbanization rates. Many theories based on western cities like the aforementioned one by Harris 
and Todaro fail to provide an explanation for this phenomenon.50 Turok and McGranahan argue that 
                                                          
41 Idem, 50-53. 
42 Unicef, Cities and Children: The Challenge of Urbanisation in Tanzania (Dar es Salaam 2012), 9. 
43 Ibidem. 
44 Idem, 12. 
45 Ibidem. 
46 Potter, Urbanisation and Planning in the Third World, 12-13. 
47 Unicef, Cities and Children, 12. 
48 Fox, ‘Urbanization as a global historical process’, 287. 
49 Ibidem. 
50 T. G. McGee, The Urbanisation Process in The Third World: Explorations in Search of a Theory (London 1971), 
20-21. 
13 
 
urbanization can still occur when there is no clear explanation in terms of economic advantages in 
cities. Whilst urbanization usually goes together with at least regional economic growth, it is not 
always necessary for it to occur. In some cases the general ideal image of being able to ‘make it in a 
city’, together with the trapping atmosphere there (coming back to the countryside is a 
disappointment and a waste of effort) rapid urbanization still prevails.51 This happened to many sub-
Saharan African nations between 1980 and 2000, Tanzania included.52 Dar es Salaam continued to 
grow quickly, causing the urbanization growth to be 9.2% between 1967 and 1978. Before the 
relation with the Dutch government is brought into the discussion, it is useful to examine closely how 
Nyerere’s government tried to execute its policies, and to what extend this worked. The amount of 
synergy with the Dutch government in development and poverty reduction can be investigated more 
thoroughly when the intentions and methods of the Tanzanian government are showcased in more 
detail. 
1.5 Government policies 
When Nyerere noticed that the voluntary cooperation he dreamt of did not happen, he started 
creating new strategies to get to his goal. Historian Justin Maeda identified eight goals that had to be 
met in the regions. Establishment of self-governing communities, better use of rural labor, taking 
advantage of economy of scale to increase production, dissemination of new values, avoidance of 
exploitation, increasing the living standard of the peasants, mobilization of people in villages by using 
the military, and national planning.53 To implement the Ujamaa policies more thoroughly, the TANU 
party relegated many executive tasks to local governments. From 1972 onward individual politicians 
and government workers had to answer to local bodies of government. The idea behind this was that 
many of the goals could be realized more easily because the local officials could influence the rural 
life in a more direct way. In this system, the Ujamaa villages be controlled and monitored more 
easily. The local governments influenced the urban/rural division of the population in several ways. 
To achieve their goal, they utilized several pull and push policies. The decentralization was mostly 
installed to increase (local) state power over where Tanzanians could live. To combat the growth of 
cities, the government tried using local governments to create multiple centers of economic activity 
and rural growth centers in regions to spread out the Ujamaa villages and local activity. This also 
granted bigger control over these desolate regions. Poor city dwellers could benefit from this 
economic activity if they moved to these regions instead. This was the government creating an active 
drain from the city to the agricultural sites. In the process, they however removed economic activity 
from the city center, making matters worse for urban dwellers that could not migrate elsewhere. 
Urban poverty grew with at least 60% because jobs were relocated from the center to rural areas or 
deleted altogether. Economic decline made matters worse for the residents of urban centers.54 In 
this way city economy neglected as a push factor, while the success and prosperity of Ujamaa villages 
would be the pull factor. They carried out this combination in other ways as well. For example, the 
government made availability of goods and services (like food, government service, healthcare) 
limited to those who registered at local party leaders, excluding many who did not or were not able 
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to comply from these matters.55 This caused inequality for illegal city dwellers as well as creating 
feeding ground for corruption, as people became dependent on local officials to be part of the 
system. Even rural farmers could be taken advantage of, as the success of their registration was in 
hands of the local government anyway. If social services were not available in the rural villages, the 
migrated Tanzanians would be worse off in both situations. The government was not able to build 
the necessary houses in time.56 The aforementioned institutions also had to be built from the ground 
up. Therefore, the net availability of these basic services and the maintenance of them deteriorated. 
In other words, the relocation of power to regional offices instead of central rule and local 
governments to create Ujamaa villages started the decline of basic maintenance of roads, sanitary 
and water supply in urban policy.57 From 1973 onwards the government started enforcing operation 
Dodoma as an ultimate effort to move the citizens away from the city to the designated towns. 
People were given an ultimatum, in which they had to move to the designated places within 3 
years.58 While at first Nyerere believed that Tanzanians would have embraced the villagization 
voluntarily, in the face of widespread resistance, Nyerere declared villagization compulsory, leading 
to, in many cases, violent confrontations as peasants and farmers were forced to move.59 Tanzanian 
citizens were pressured in multiple ways by overzealous government officials and officers to leave 
their houses or land. Instances of violence and setting fire to houses were not part of official policy, 
but nevertheless there were some occurrences of this.60 Tanzania's more intense policies during this 
era of forced villagization, were a final attempt to bridge the rural-urban divide, and to create a 
uniform citizenry.61 Nationally, emphasis was laid on socialism and rural development. Hence less 
budget and emphasis was allocated to urban development. Tanzanians working in city planning like 
land officers and town planners at both regional and district levels became employed by the Regional 
Development Director (RDD), and got all financial support via the RDD's budget. They became 
responsible and answerable to RDD because he was their employer. He could even allocate the funds 
allotted to urban development to other activities, on which they could not question him.62 This did 
not only cause corruption by power because of the utter dependence of city planners, but it also 
made sure the necessary budget was not provided but redistributed to rural projects. Another part of 
this plan was the movement of government activities. Aside from the decentralization and the 
increased authority of local governments, the TANU government decided, that the next step in 
deurbanization would be the creation of a new capital for the nation. The new capital would be 
called Dodoma, as did the operation to move Tanzanians to villages. The idea was that relocating the 
capital would decrease the demographic pressure on Dar es Salam. To build this town, the Tanzanian 
government relied on foreign aid to complete the plans, with the nation suffering from a lack of 
expertise and capital to complete the town. Technical assistance to build the city was given from 
several European countries and the town was designed by Canadian urban planners.63 This project 
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and hiring this assistance however, cost the Tanzanian government a lot of resources and money.64 
Tanzania was, according to several historians, not able to produce their own qualified social 
geographers and urban planners and hence became dependent on foreign help in managing its 
demographics.65  
In the end matters were made more difficult by the fact that most rural residents were not as willing 
to migrate as expected, as they had ties to the ground they lived on, or to their friends and family. 
This turned out to be a huge problem as many Tanzanians had to be forced to comply with the 
wishes of the government, leading to conflict and unmotivated workers. The incentive to make the 
Ujamaa system work was missing for many migrants. Promises about better living conditions were 
broken, because the government wasn’t able to meet the expectations. This caused a distrust in the 
effectiveness of the system and thereby an unwillingness to cooperate for the citizens.66 Another 
problem was that economic growth was hard to establish under the low production. Tanzania 
changed from a country that produced a surplus in food to a nation that had to import food to feed 
its population, which suffered from several famines. Many working systems were broken down and 
overthrown, while the Ujamaa villages often had virtually no production. Expensive government 
programs taught the rural residents from the towns to produce a certain type of good or grow a 
certain crop, which was a time consuming and inefficient process. A good example of this inefficiency 
was a Tanzanian tribe that was very well accustomed to growing bananas. Government teachers 
came in to teach them a different way of production. The bananas they were made to produce for 
the Ujamaa system with new method actually lowered production by 10% making it more inefficient 
and less resilient against pests and weather conditions.67 The deteriorating production, paired with 
failure to maintain services left Tanzania as one of the poorest nations in the world towards the end 
of Nyerere’s rule. The situation at the end was that Tanzania was dependent on large imports and 
Western aid to feed its citizens. Therefore a good cooperation with its foreign donors would have 
been vital to overcome the economic difficulties Tanzania faced. In the next chapters the reception 
of the economic effects of Ujamaa and specifically the countries relationship and cooperation with 
the Netherlands will be examined more close. Did the Dutch policy align with Tanzania’s, and did the 
internal changes in Tanzania affect their relationship? 
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2. Friends on paper, separated in practice 
2.1 Introduction to the second part of the thesis 
In the first chapter of the thesis I tried to explain Nyerere’s ideas about urbanisation and economy, as 
well as reasons to why he chose this approach in an international context. In the second part of this 
thesis the focus will be redirected to the international community and the Netherlands in particular. 
To accurately do this I comprised three ways by which it can be found in what ways the government 
and the nation responded. Since the secondary source material on the diplomatic relations between 
the countries is so scarce, this second part will be more heavily based on primary source material. 
Firstly I found that a good way to investigate the relation between these countries and Tanzania is 
looking at details of the given development aid. Most bilateral agreements with African countries 
were not on equal basis and often the portion of aid was of larger volume then the volume trade 
when looking at the balance of payments.68 Foreign aid has also historically been an important 
means to influence economic and political policy in developing countries.69 Building on this principle 
it can be stated it was likely that Tanzanian policy that was regarded as negative in the Netherlands, 
would lead to a drop in finance, whilst favourable policy would be rewarded with more aid. Western 
donors have always favoured states with a stable economy and human rights protection to set an 
example for other countries in the developing world. The deterioration of production and the 
forceful movement of the Tanzanian people would not be regarded as favourable by the Dutch 
government. Therefore, a decline in money could for instance showcase a negative reaction to the 
Tanzanian situation. Another assumption that can be made is that the level of direct influence would 
increase at times where the Tanzanian policy on poverty alleviation was unsatisfactory in the eyes of 
the Dutch government. This is probably in line with multilateral organisations like the IMF and the 
World Bank who decreased their aid volume and demanded more influence in how Tanzania 
organised its economy as the years went by. Looking at these bilateral agreements therefore 
provides insight in how the Dutch government and NGO’s reacted to the political and economic 
changes in Tanzania. With this, it is necessary to first give an overview of the international perception 
and reception of Ujamaa when Nyerere announced his plans. In this way it can be examined how the 
attitudes changed from the start towards the end of Nyerere’s reign. The second way to approach 
this problem is to look at the Dutch newspapers and the information they provided on Tanzania. 
Were the anti-urbanisation policies noteworthy, and did newspapers report on the effects on the 
Tanzanian population and economy? Did the Dutch government discuss these matters in public and 
how did parties involved respond to this? Newspapers can provide an insight in the stance on 
matters in Tanzania and also how much of it was known to the government and the population of 
the Netherlands. If the Dutch government made negative or critical statements regarding the 
situation, it would surely be mentioned in the news. 
Lastly and most importantly, the main means of communication between the Dutch and Tanzanian 
states is done through embassies. Over the years countless letters have been sent and other 
correspondence has been recorded. The best way to see how the Dutch government and embassy 
reacted to the changes in Tanzania would be looking at this correspondence. Given the fact that the 
government did not report on their relations in a formal report, it is evident that these primary 
sources would give the best insight in the general Dutch reaction in absence of official documents. 
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Combining these three approaches, I feel confident that the results will lead a clear overview in the 
reaction of the Dutch government to the Tanzanian situation. The research will provide answers for 
how the government, embassy and newspapers responded to the effects of Nyerere’s urbanisation 
policy. With this combined information, it will be made clear how the Dutch reaction influenced 
policy as well.  
2.2 Initial international reception of Ujamaa 
Since Tanzania was determined to uphold a non-aligned stance since its independence, NGO’s 
started to try and help the freshly announced state since its beginnings. The World Bank tried to 
implement the same approach it had for other newly decolonised states. Since most of Tanzania’s 
surplus production output was meant for the European market because of colonialism, the World 
Bank figured that Tanzania should diversify, upscale and intensify its agricultural industry, for 
producing cash crops for the foreign market. This capitalist policy meant high expenditures in foreign 
machinery (capital) to be able to upscale said agricultural production. This would mean an initial 
heavy reliance on foreign funds as a result of these plans.70 However these attempts did not produce 
the desired results at all before Arusha. The loan deals that the state needed to disclose to were very 
expensive, but nationwide poverty was not alleviated with this influx of foreign money.71 In this 
sense it came as no surprise that Tanzania tried to divert from these blueprints and move towards a 
vastly different, socialist approach.72 Though when Tanzania made its first steps toward trying to 
formulate the socialist economic policies they would adopt later, the World Bank credited itself for 
inspiring the Tanzanian government, especially in its focus on equal development in rural formerly 
neglected areas.73 The most negative initial response came from British right wing conservatives and 
avid supporters of colonialism and imperialism.74 These negative responses cannot be seen separate 
from the political acts of non-alignment, Tanzania’s stance on decolonisation of the African 
continent, its boycott of South African products and the departure from the commonwealth. This 
made Tanzania an unpredictable player on the chessboard of international politics, to the concern of 
the conservative critics. Despite the fact that ties with the ‘second world’ and China were not very 
strong (even in 1976 when the Ujamaa system was in full effect they only accounted for 5% of the 
amount of foreign aid, compared to 78% from the traditional west), Tanzania’s more or less neutral 
stance was seen as hostile, compared to other African nations.75 Having any ties at all with nations 
like East-Germany was seen as an appeal to the East in the cold war era.76 This was however a 
geopolitical argument. The fact that Tanzania was trying its distinct Ujamaa-village approach was 
never contested or criticized on economic grounds. Leftists in Great Britain applauded the economic 
and political break from the West and especially the former coloniser as a great means of 
establishing a national identity.77 Around the time that Nyerere published the Arusha declaration, the 
world seemed exited to see how this ambitious socialist experiment would unfold. Simultaneously 
Nyereres political stance inspired other African nationalist to strive for independence. However the 
temptation of western or soviet aid that Nyerere tried to ignore proved to be too big for many other 
African nations. Directly following the advice of the World Bank and Western countries from the start 
has had mixed results for African countries. Nations can be pushed into becoming dependent on 
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foreign investments, outside factors will influence the demand and the market will be flooded with 
low quality cheaper goods produced abroad.78 If a country strives for autonomous control of its 
economy and self-reliance for its citizens, it is clear to see how these views on how to run a nation’s 
economy would collide. The NGO’s and Western states did not try to stop Tanzania from making 
these decisions. In short, Nyerere’s public announcement of his economic plans for Tanzania was met 
with great enthusiasm by NGO’s and Western, Asian and African states alike. All initial criticism had a 
geopolitical base, and even institutions that are often considered (neo)liberal like the IMF and the 
World Bank were optimistic and positive about the new and honest economic approach that the 
Arusha declaration described. Various world leaders speak very positively about Nyerere when asked 
about him. The combination of his political stance, humbleness, integrity and passion for improving 
the situation for Tanzanian citizens is appreciated widely. The South African ANC called Nyerere a 
brilliant philosopher, an outstanding leader and a champion for the entire African continent.79 Bill 
Clinton and Tony Blair have described this man as a pioneering leader for self-government in Africa. It 
feels like the international stage wanted to give Nyerere a chance to try and crystalize the vision he 
had for his nation. Conservative commentator Anthony Daniels argues that the world was so 
desperately in need for a positive story from Africa, an African hero that they only focus on Nyerere’s 
hopeful words and not the quality of his actual policies. He proceeds to call him the ‘professor of 
poverty’.80 Regardless, it can be stated that for some reason, at least the theoretical explanation of 
Ujamaa was initially met with great enthusiasm. Why were all parties so positive about Tanzania’s 
attempt at African socialism? What was Tanzania’s appeal for foreign donors that made it such a 
large recipient of foreign aid despite its non-alignment policies? And why did the Netherlands in 
particular feel the need to become such an important partner? 
2.3 How did the relation between the Netherlands and Tanzania come to 
be? 
Most bilateral transactions with Tanzania since its independence have been various types of aid in 
form of money, loans, machinery and expertise. Not only has the Netherlands relatively been the 
second largest contributor in aid for Tanzania after Sweden, this even also is the case in absolute 
numbers. Tanzania has always been a major partner in development cooperation and a net receiver 
of aid. In the Dutch policy change in focussing on certain areas, regions and states, Tanzania has 
always been on the list of countries and places that received special attention. No other sub-Saharan 
country has received similar amounts of bilateral aid from the Dutch government. Between 1970 and 
1992, Tanzania in total received over 13000 million dollars in foreign aid. This was over 80% of 
resources inflow over the period despite also having a large trade deficit. Tanzania has as a result 
been the second most aided country in Sub-Sahara Africa over this period. 75% of the worldwide aid 
that was given to Tanzania in this time has been granted as a gift, whilst average interest rates were 
kept under 1%.81 20 to 25% of all the aid Tanzania received was made available by multilateral 
institutions, 50% of which was provided by the World Bank.82 In general, the most important bilateral 
partners for Tanzania were states with a fellow social-democratic background. These social-democrat 
countries like Sweden, Denmark and Norway have been the biggest partners throughout the years. 
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These countries were accompanied by the Netherlands and Germany (note that these countries were 
all large contributors to foreign aid in general but saw Tanzania as an important recipient for multiple 
reasons.) Sweden provided nearly 15% of total aid for the country, followed by the Netherlands as 
the second largest contributor and then Germany each paying about 8% of the total sum.83 A quick 
calculation shows that the Netherlands according to this source paid 1040 million dollars in 30 
years.84 The amount of aid given continued to grow throughout the 1970’s, despite Nyerere’s 
methods getting more and more repressive.85 Reasons for this could be the increased national 
incomes of donor states alongside with Tanzania’s deteriorating funds and food reserves forcing the 
country to open up to foreign influence and reach out to receive aid. This raised the important 
question why the Dutch government chose Tanzania in particular as a priority in Africa. There is 
however no clear answer for this question. The ministry gives the short explanation that the Dutch 
government identified with the priorities of the Tanzanian government in providing primary 
education and basic medical aid throughout every corner of the country.86 Agro-industrialisation and 
striving for the provision of drinking water were also regarded as good policy.87 Other factors may 
include a relatively good human rights policy (putting aside the forceful villagization and oppression 
of political enemies) and the countries non-aligned stance in international relations.88 Moreover on 
the international stage, Tanzania became a prolific member of the group of 77, fighting the north-
south gap in development and economic activity. Their pan-African support for independent African 
nations in the south of Africa, created good will amongst those new states and western countries 
that opposed (neo) colonialism. This was a major factor for attracting international aid in general. 
This was however more of a reason for international multilateral organisations to aid the country, as 
it wasn’t part of the Dutch policy that they supported this in particular. The same can be said for 
Nyerere’s vigorous efforts to combat corruption, even creating laws that prohibit politicians from 
fulfilling side-jobs to avoid personal interest in affairs.89 Also, journalist Anthony Sampson makes a 
point that Nyerere’s aversion against racism made him popular on the international stage.90 He 
obviously rejected white on black racism (like in South Africa and Rhodesia) but also strongly 
opposed black on white or black on black racism, even at the cost of the national popular vote.91 
These reasons are however once again, quite universal, being important for both multi- and bilateral 
partnership, but providing no particular reason why the Netherlands would specifically choose 
Tanzania. Another reason that is brought up that may offer some explanation, is that the Christian 
communities and therefore confessional parties had specific interest to aid Tanzania.92 This was 
mostly because there was a large base of Dutch missionaries in the country to begin with. Why this 
situation occurred naturally is unknown. Thereby, Christianity wasn’t even Tanzania’s most practiced 
religion, which was Islam. There were many other countries that had Dutch missionaries, who had a 
far greater Christian population. Moreover, the Dutch government did not cooperate with these 
missionaries that moved to Tanzania, since they were working for their own respective Christian 
organisation independently. Why the Dutch government would engage in such an intensive relation 
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is therefore still not explained. A final reason could have been the belief that Nyerere was not a 
corrupt leader, donor states actually believed he was really trying to create the best situation for 
population of the country.93 All these factors explain why Tanzania was not limited in the amount of 
aid they received (with donors and multilateral organisations lowering aid as sanction, which was 
also often done for Tanzania in the 1980-2000 period), but do not completely explain why the 
Netherlands chose this country in particular. When we look at the actual aid policy of the Dutch 
ministry, apart from intentions, things get even more confusing. 
2.4 Agriculture 
The Netherlands have had changing views on to what extent they had to contribute to Tanzania’s 
agricultural sector. Over the years many projects have been started to aid the Tanzanians in 
increasing their agricultural production. Aside from the government loans, micro-scale local projects 
have been started to teach agricultural techniques, provide machinery, or to finance parts of the 
agricultural sector. Close to 90% of the population kept working in this field and living in the rural 
areas, most of them were self-substance farmers as well, which means agricultural reforms impacted 
them heavily.94 Most of Tanzania’s soils are unfertile, and sufficient rainfall is by default unreliable 
throughout most of the country.95 The only exception to this general unfertile environment are the 
volcanic highlands and riverbanks.96 Therefore it has always been hard to maintain a certain 
production level consistently. Given the geographic makeup of Tanzania it therefore seemed logical 
that the government tried focusing on development of rural areas, and moving a possible workforce 
to certain areas. Since half of the agro-economic zones boast infertile soil, it was not a weird idea to 
want to relocate citizens to favourable hubs and districts.97 It would take high capital and labour 
investments to make the arid and unreliable areas fit for providing the necessary production that was 
needed. The Tanzanian government tried to solve this by making use of its primary production factor, 
namely labour. The idea behind this was that the Ujamaa villages would be able to provide the 
constant and intensive cultivation that was needed, by working as a village community. The Dutch 
officials however preferred the usage of capital, be it training Tanzanians to use the soil more 
efficiently, or provide capital in the form of tools and machinery in some way. Despite efforts on both 
ends, by 1991 only 5% of the arable land was permanently cultivated.98 Further conflicts of interest 
between donor and government were that donors liked to see the farmers produce cash crops, for 
which the prices fluctuated dramatically, but in good times were believed to yield a much higher 
value, benefitting the economy as a whole. The Tanzanian government believed in self-reliance and 
deemed food production for the own state as vital for this goal, despite specialisation probably 
providing more state income. As shown in the first chapter, the government did not have a good 
grasp on how to make cash crops a reliable source of income. Inefficient production, poor 
distribution and low prices made the biggest sector perform badly for years. All agricultural problems 
caused the quality of soils to deteriorate rapidly nationwide.99 The excessive agricultural industry of 
cattle farming and livestock management, and the rapid growth of the rural population degenerated 
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the ground quality further in these years.100 Since these two approaches couldn’t be combined 
properly and the Tanzanian state couldn’t cope with the problems that came with changing the 
shape of its agricultural production, by abolishing hiring labourers, changing production methods and 
the creation of Ujamaa villages in general, the agricultural production continued to be unsustainable. 
The production was too low and inefficient for the state to deal with external factors like extreme 
weather. Another factor that limited production was the lack of energy sources in the rural areas. 
Since most villages did not have power, households spent more than 20% of their time collecting 
firewood, thus leaving them with less time to work.101 In this sense being dependant on this 
agricultural sector was risky, and led to the government needing to import food for years on end.102 
The Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs made a report on the effectiveness of poverty alleviation 
policies in 2004.103 The ministry criticizes the economic and demographic policies of Ujamaa in 
hindsight. The urbanization policy that was part of with the Ujamaa ideal is called a dismal failure 
with no visible positive effects on agricultural production.104 Furthermore the Dutch government 
criticizes Tanzania’s officials favouring subsistence farming over more export-oriented cash-crop 
production, considering this poor management.105 This prioritising is seen as a natural result of 
Ujamaa politics, using Hyden’s work as a reference for this.106 The ministry believes that this held 
back economic growth for Tanzania. That is why the Dutch aid was not directed to aid the farmers 
that were taking care of general food production, but that the Dutch rather spent their resources on 
enterprises that produced for the foreign trade market. Dutch agricultural aid for Tanzania therefore 
went to corporations instead of small scale farmers and Ujamaa villages.107 For livestock farming, 
most aid was reserved for state owned companies that turned out to be far from efficient.108 Only 
from the 1980’s onward did the focus of Dutch aid shift to help individual villages, but this happened 
when the government was already forced to reform and also change its production system. The 
economic damage of unsynchronised policies in agricultural production had already dealt great 
damage in the process. It shows that the negative effects of low production and the removal of 
service and economic activity from urbanised areas were not seen as problem until halfway through 
the 1980’s. This in turn, shows that these economic ideas that came with Ujamaa were not taken into 
account when creating policy.109 The desired economic reform that was demanded when the 
economy continued to suffer in the second half of the 1980’s focused on privatizing state-owned 
enterprises, in line with what many other African countries were also pressured to do by the 
multilateral organisations. The Dutch approach followed this line, in spite of Nyerere’s ideas and 
wishes.110 Even though Tanzania had to comply with these demands, they did not improve living 
conditions for most rural dwellers at all. The liberalisation of crop production in fact only improved 
the lives of cash-crop farmers, and only after 1985.111 Overall, the relocation of aid to a more project 
driven sector support, and the preference to help export oriented companies severely clashed with 
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the Tanzanian Ujamaa policy and showed the dispute about what approach was best for the 
countries development, between the Dutch policymakers and Tanzanian government.112 It has been 
shown that the Dutch government did not take the policy of village driven production into account, 
since it focused on bigger corporations producing cash crops like sugar.113 These differences 
contributed to a drop in aid flow of over 25%.114 In the 1990’s the Dutch government eventually 
decided to discontinue all agricultural support on which will be elaborated later in the chapter.  
2.5 Industry  
One thing most foreign donors (aside from the Nordic countries that also emphasized assistance in 
rural agricultural development) prioritized was helping to set up an industrial sector. Seeing the 
success and rapid development of multiple Asian countries and regions, it was believed that this was 
the fastest and most reliable way towards economic development. Therefore, much policy was 
geared towards assisting in the purchase of the necessary capital, to support business, increase 
production and to provide the ability to utilise machinery for producing industrial products. Most of 
these industries were based in cities. This was because they were more easily accessible because of 
infrastructure and housed more capable employees for construction and operation of the machines.  
These industries had to be built from the ground up and were therefore accompanied by large 
expenditures. The foreign donors also favoured the capital-intensive type of industries that required 
much imports to run.115 Unfortunately production for the national market did not work because 
demand was almost non-existent inside the country. Production was also too low to cater to foreign 
markets, and combined with the poor management of prices by the government and existing trade 
barriers, it is not hard to see why these efforts to create a functioning industrial sector did not work 
as hoped. The idea of extra investment in the secondary sector, that was also shared by the Dutch 
ministry, did not fit the shape of Tanzanian society and therefore most factories ended up producing 
to a fraction of their capacity, if they actually did produce at all.116 Nevertheless 60% of Dutch aid 
that was provided for Tanzania went to manufacturing industries in the capital Dar es Salam.117 This 
was a polar opposite of what the government tried to accomplish at the time therefore rendering 
these efforts largely inefficient.118 Over two thirds of help went to the urban areas of the countries, 
which contained a relatively very small percentage of the nation’s citizens and whereas the countries 
policy was geared towards providing service in rural areas.119 This once again shows that the Dutch 
ministry and the Tanzanian government were not able or willing to align their strategies and goals. 
When the aid focus changed from capital investment assistance to a guided program assistance it 
was not done because of the wishes of the Tanzanian government, but by a general distrust in the 
government’s capability to put the investments to good use.120 The guided assistance went against 
Tanzania’s wishes of being self-reliant and avoiding a position where foreign forces could have 
influence over the nations policies. The project-wise approach did not achieve the desired results as 
well. Most of the aid projects turned out to be ineffective, have negative results despite efforts, or 
ended up being heavily delayed (usually indefinitely).121 The technical capabilities of the Tanzanian 
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residents and the states officials were vastly overestimated.122 The project-wise approach did not 
work because the projects were often constructed too hastily, were too large and complex, lacked 
required manpower and were not supported by the Tanzanian government.123 Despite this, they 
continued for a long time as main method of providing aid. The ministry concludes in its report that 
macro-economic support had been unsuccessful because it was focussed on industrial development 
instead of rural development.124 This is something that had been addressed for years in vain by the 
Tanzanian government. 
2.6 IMF, World Bank and economic problems 
As showcased in the first, and in this chapter, the Tanzanian government had to deal with hunger, a 
declining economy, debt, disease and shortages. This was partially circumstantial, but also a result of 
the government’s economic plans and urbanization policies. But this chapter has also shown that the 
efforts of donor countries like the Netherlands have actually had a negative effect on Tanzania’s 
economy too at times. The problems started when a rise in expenditures to finance capital 
investment, and the setup of industries caused imports to grow rapidly. Simultaneously the 
government’s reforms in agriculture that have been discussed, and the worldwide drop in prices for 
many cash crops that had been produced for the purpose of export caused a big disbalance. National 
income therefore dropped whilst foreign debt grew rapidly.125 Ujamaa policies severely limited the 
outflow of goods. The government was not willing to export too many products in general because of 
the governments strive for self-reliance and the heavy shortages the nation faced.126 Another aspect 
that played part in the low export numbers that continued to be insufficient for sustainable growth 
throughout more than three decades was the deterioration of Dar es Salam. The city used to be a 
main port for shipping goods to Zambia, Burundi, Rwanda and Uganda.127 Besides all these countries 
dealing with their own problems in this period of time, the complete breakdown of services and 
roads in the city ruined a potential market, but also the connection to foreign markets in a way.128 
This situation led to smuggle becoming increasingly lucrative and a much bigger part of the 
Tanzanian economy.129 Smugglers did not have to hand over their production or goods to the 
government companies, but instead were able to negotiate prices their selves, usually at a much 
better rate than the government companies got. This got to the point where over 30% of the national 
income was lost under the radar of researchers and statisticians because the trades were done 
illegally. Africans held virtually no production factors in the country. Since Tanzanians were 
prohibited from taking tertiary jobs in the city, the Tanzanian government had to buy out all the 
foreign investors and Asians that filled the gap in first instance.130 This was a very costly matter. After 
the start of Dodoma, many services to people broke down beyond later repair in the city.131 Tanzania 
was unable to adequately provide enough engineers, planners and economists to carry out the 
envisioned plans.132 When the economic situation worsened, Tanzania was forced to let go of the 
ideal of self-reliance and became dependent on bilateral agreements and donations, mainly from 
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Nordic and Scandinavian befriended states.133 When Tanzania was on collision course with the IMF 
the sympathetic countries (like the Netherlands) increased their aid to propose an alternative route 
for economic reform. From 1984 onwards this pressure was greatly increased because the Tanzanian 
national currency became too weak for normal business.134 They had to renegotiate with the IMF and 
World Bank, and follow their economic reforms. This marked the incoming end of Ujamaa when the 
sovereignty was sacrificed for economic assistance.135 Tanzania would be put in a dangerous 
situation, poor, heavily indebted and dependant on complying with the wishes of donors. Tanzania 
had however always been on the good side of many donor countries.136 Policies like the emphasis on 
social services and healthcare throughout the country were applauded and appreciated by the 
international community. The provision of basic needs in rural areas was something that was lacking 
in many other states, and the idea of self-reliance for the country and the villages reeled in donations 
and support. 
As explained in the first part of the chapter, initially, institutions like the World Bank and the IMF 
were not practically against the idea of a socialist state focussing on improving conditions for a 
sizeable rural population. The sheer intentions of favouring well-being of citizens over economic 
growth is not seen as a problem, especially considering the demographic makeup of the country’s 
population. The World Bank reports on Tanzania’s intentions in a very positive fashion, saying that 
‘There is probably no country in the while of Africa that has expressed the meaning and objectives of 
its development program with greater clarity or higher nobility than Tanzania’.137 The institution goes 
on to state that ‘The Arusha statement is a testimony to the commitment of the leaders and the 
countries seriousness of purpose’, commenting on the energy that is put in to create and shape the 
society Nyerere envisioned.138 Besides that, the economic focus on agricultural development is seen 
as ‘wise’, given the fact that at the time of the Arusha declaration, 94% of the population was 
working rural areas in the agricultural sector. This is however the only positive comment about 
economic policy that is made. The World Bank feels that the main objective for Tanzania would be to 
ensure rapid economic development whilst holding control the forces of class formation and other 
factors that would widen the gaps of income.139 The sheer need for fast economic growth was not 
shared by the Tanzanian government that preferred personal happiness and health for its citizens. In 
this sense the views on what the ideal makeup of Tanzanian’s macro-economic policy would look like 
differed from the start. This is why the approval of Ujamaa by these international non-governmental 
institutions was superficial. They gave Tanzania a chance to try, but believed that it would not really 
work behind the scenes. The criticism that they voiced mostly came down to the lack of theoretical 
evidence that the plans would work, and the fact that Tanzanian officials lacked data and expertise to 
make their plans concrete. The World Bank literally wrote in their report on Tanzania’s economy, 
that Ujamaa lacks a global framework that supports their economic ideas.140 Journalists have claimed 
on this matter that Nyerere would follow a principle to its logical end rather than the realistic one. 141 
In this light, international institutions would fear a leader driving a complete country down an 
unknown path that could potentially lead to poverty. That is why they fell the need to advice the 
nations economists about the benefits of having a less extreme approach. In other words, the 
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institutions felt that no other country had tried this approach before and that Tanzania would be 
better off if they just adopted the common economic strategy. Despite this, the World Bank tried to 
offer advice in the spirit of what could hypothetically make Ujamaa work. One thing the World Bank 
really emphasizes, is the importance of the collection of data. They consider the lack of information 
on the economic output at the time of publishing, as well as knowledge on the production potential 
of many less developed areas as vital in being able to evaluate and improve on the Ujamaa system as 
it is.142 The World Bank feared that the low education level of officials would limit the production 
capacity, and the extent to which the Tanzanian government could execute their plans.143 The World 
Bank concluded that based on the provided numbers, small scale farming in Ujamaa villages proved 
to result in a higher production per capita, than the larger enterprises and villages.144 The World 
Banks theory that specialisation, diversification and especially upscaling of agricultural activity always 
had a positive effect on production and thereby the nation’s economy. Instead of seeing the 
evidence as a reason to give the Tanzanian approach a chance, the World Bank wanted the 
Tanzanian government to collect more information so they could prove the existence of the positive 
effects of a trade-off between the two approaches.145 They think this situation occurs because of the 
lack of skilled manpower in the areas where agricultural upscaling had taken place.146 They 
simultaneously pleaded for a more intense government guidance for the villages and increased 
economic personal autonomy. This seemed very contradictory. This was because the World Bank 
generally was in favour of private enterprises, diversification and a free market. However, as they 
tried to give advice that could be applied in the Ujamaa system, they ended up with a hybrid 
combination of free-market ideas and government controlled socialism. They made the point that 
the government should make efforts to take away ambiguity on the goals of the system for the 
villagers. The idea the World Bank came up with is that the production must be diversified and 
upscaled without losing the sense of community that enabled higher production in smaller Ujamaa 
villages according to the numbers.147 To make this possible the government would have needed to 
make sure that production would increase by multiple ways. Firstly they were supposed to set clear 
production targets and time expectations to reach said targets.148 In this way the government could 
make sure villages had a clear goal to work towards instead of a vague idea of shared responsibility. 
The World Bank was sure that every village had to produce a surplus rather than just be self-
sustainable. This surplus should then be sold for the foreign market to provide the funds needed for 
the developments of the areas that would lag behind in productivity.149 The World Bank thereby 
believed that innovation and capital investment must raise the production, since they feel that the 
Tanzanian government is making good efforts in maximizing the production factor for labour and 
that they lack knowledge about soil quality and access to arable lands with enough output to 
increase agricultural output by improving the nature factor.150 These plans did however not align 
with the initial goals of the TANU party. They did not want to realise changes with money gotten 
from production for a foreign market, but rather wanted to ensure that every single village would be 
self-sustainable in the first place. All in all it can be stated that the World Bank initially tried to 
cooperate with the Tanzanian government, by giving advice that would not collide with Nyerere’s 
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way of thinking, but that the economic ideas of the international institutions, like those of the 
western donors were too different to merge into a cohesive assisted policy.  
This proved to be a problem later, because as operation Dodoma enrolled, the economy started to 
suffer more heavily, and the oppressive and repressive measures started to outweigh the pull 
factors. The reaction to the economic problems was far greater than the concern about human rights 
and democracy, since the Tanzanian did not or was unable to follow the advice of the financial 
institutions. As a result some multilateral donators started to back out.151 These multilateral 
institutions drew these conclusions quicker than the European donor states that continued to 
provide aid and back the Nyerere’s government’s decisions. In this sense they were ahead of the 
decisions of the donor states that were in bilateral agreement, because their reaction was usually 
linked to the decisions of the financial institutions. Tanzania’s economic woes caused the 
government to miss deadlines in loan repayments, limiting the credibility and inflow of money in 
general. Whenever Tanzania tried to follow policies that were proposed by financial institutions they 
mostly did not work out the way that both parties wanted to. The relationship got distorted because 
the cash crops that Tanzania had to produce did not bring in the desired economic revenue. The 
prices for coffee and sisal dropped dramatically, and dramatic harvests led to a lack of surplus. Non-
self-sustaining villages had to be supported with food and financial aid to make up for this problem. 
Especially the IMF, that started to clash with other developing nations in this era, started to distance 
itself from Tanzania on account of colliding views on the economy.152 The IMF believes that 
Tanzania’s national policies undermined the nation’s economic potential. The institution argues that 
state ownership and intervention undermined economic performance. Low centrally determined 
prices and inefficient public marketing boards caused a sharp decline in agricultural production, 
amplifying Tanzania’s economic problems.153 These problems created a rift between the institution 
and the nation, both parties believing that cooperation was very hard to accomplish.154 The IMF 
stated that ‘multi-and bilateral donors want to have confidence that the microeconomic policies and 
projects they are supporting will not be derailed or undermined in their effectiveness by wrong-
headed microeconomic policies leading, among others, to high inflation, as had happened in 
Tanzania since independence’ regarding the subject.155 Bilateral agreements however, did not suffer 
as much, as they reacted intensely but only years later.156 The heavy emphasis on economic output 
and attracting direct foreign investment, makes it seem like the economic policy and in the 
diplomatic relations weighed more than the negative effects on freedom and prosperity Nyerere’s 
Ujamaa and operation Dodoma caused for institutions and Western donor states. A clear example of 
this is that from 1983 other states started to follow the doctrine of the World Bank in suddenly 
heavily criticizing the Tanzanian social but mostly economic policies. This led to a drop in aid revenue 
for Tanzania, also from the Netherlands.157 The change in the relationship with Tanzania was not an 
isolated event as this aligns with the Dutch change on stance of development aid in this period in 
general.158 Instead of negatively judging the repressive measures Nyerere’s officials instated, and 
critically acclaiming Tanzania’s economic and social policies, the Dutch state never seemed to let 
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internal affairs influence their policy. However, the Netherlands aligned itself with the stance of the 
IMF and the World Bank, only starting to become increasingly critical when Tanzania faced problems 
with being unable to repay its giant debts.159 In short it can therefore be said that the Netherlands 
too considered economic reasons that multilateral organisations found problematic, more important 
than political reasons. The exact motive why the Dutch government started to distance itself from 
Tanzania from the 80’s onward remains unknown according to the source material.160 The principles 
of Ujamaa accounted for support but when it became increasingly economically unviable, the 
attitude towards it completely changed. The economical plans regarding the country and especially 
Dar es Salam had not changed very much since the declarations in 1967, so it seems strange that the 
international donors and multilateral institutions suddenly opposed Tanzania’s economic and social 
plans. Furthermore, it seems that the whole movement of people was opposed in international 
spheres but did not make any impact on Dutch and Scandinavian money inflow. Only when Tanzania 
started clashing with the IMF did the Netherlands start to change their attitude. This leads me to 
believe that business and money interests were considered more important than the effectiveness of 
the Tanzanian government and the actual results of the Ujamaa projects that broke down services 
and production. 
Another seemingly confusing matter is the way Tanzania’s way of dealing with poverty was handled 
by the donors. There was yet again a very remarkable shift in attitude. Tanzania’s focus on rural 
development and efforts to combat nationwide poverty and provide basic service throughout the 
countries rural areas was, as said, applauded and welcomed. When most of the Western world saw a 
wave of privatisation (for example the economic policy under the rule of Reagan, Thatcher and in the 
Netherlands Lubbers) Tanzania was expected to comply to these ideas on economic policy as well. 
When the state started to be unable to repay its loans, organisations and donors stepped in to 
pressure Tanzania into using its national income to pay off investors. Tanzania’s government could 
not spend money on poverty reduction and social services in the 1980’s. This is because most of the 
collected revenue and tax incomes could not be redistributed among the population because foreign 
donors needed to be paid off first.161 This in light of the history of the relations with donors almost 
seems to be ironic. Donors, including the Netherlands encouraged increasing foreign debt by heavy 
investments and loans to set up what would turn out to be, failing small-scale industries. After this 
failed, Tanzania was forced to repay the loans with a very low national income, instead of allowing 
the country to spend the money on its citizens. Then this was followed by donors being upset with 
Tanzania for not being able to help the poor on micro-level like the Tanzanian government had 
always intended from the beginning. Looking back, the Dutch wanted to do small-scale projects when 
macro-economic support was necessary for poverty reduction, instead of long term industry growth 
and local initiatives aside from the nationwide Ujamaa-goals. Now that the Tanzanian government 
needed to pay the price for these loans, the attitude has changed to blaming them on the fact they 
had no poverty reduction policy, which they actually used to have before, but got no help with.162 At 
the end of Nyerere’s rule, imports had quadrupled and debt to foreign donors had become 2.5 times 
the size of the country’s national income.163 In the 1990’s up to 30% of the national budget was spent 
on foreign debt repayments alone.164 The ministry reports that the rather drastic drop in the amount 
of aid reserved for Tanzania after 1992 is inexplicable, especially because the country showed no 
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signs of not being dependant on aid anymore.165 In short this demonstrates the warped shift in 
expectations by the Dutch government. They went from applauding Tanzania’s poverty reduction 
methods, to criticizing them when the world bank started having problems with the African nation 
not being able to pay back loans, and then criticizing them even more for spending so little on social 
matters it after the country complied to the reforms that were imposed on them.166 
These are not the only cases of seemingly counterintuitive measures by the Dutch government. For 
example, Nyerere is critiqued for underspending in the agricultural sector in the ministries report, 
whilst the Tanzanian government was encouraged to allocate its budget to debt repayments and 
industrial development. Foreign investments in agriculture were only 8% of the total amount 
received by Tanzania, and continued to drop every year, despite the government’s policy being 
geared towards rural agricultural production. Another final interesting discrepancy between the 
ideas and goals of the Tanzanian and Dutch government was visible in the times they focussed on 
focussing policy on macro- or microlevel. When the Tanzanian government was forced to at least 
partially halt its efforts in achieving development in rural areas and made to focus on 
commercialisation and debt relief, the Dutch government decided to start focussing on rural 
development.167 In other words, when Tanzania stopped their rural focus to comply with the donor’s 
wishes, efforts were increased to focus on rural areas.168 In this sense the Dutch government was 
always lagging behind on what was necessary according to the Tanzanian government. After 
Nyerere’s rule the Dutch government even decided to discontinue their support to the agricultural 
sector altogether, based on the premise that the Tanzanian government was unable to manage it 
correctly, although this was something that had been known since the early 70’s, as the next two 
chapters will demonstrate.169 Moreover this actually meant that more help would be necessary to 
combat these flaws. Cooperation with the Tanzanian government could have undoubtedly made 
things much easier for both parties. The ministry states that this regional focus was beneficial for the 
Dutch policy, because it made it easier to provide aid with visible results.170 However the ministry 
argues that this was not the case at all for the Tanzanians, with the wide array of project based aid 
usually not being beneficial for the Tanzanians in general.171 A final example that at the end of 
Nyerere’s rule the country was going to be supposed to be helped with macro-economic assistance 
for attracting foreign donors and increasing production by the Dutch ministry. This had been asked 
for years and years prior this policy change by the Tanzanian government, as the fourth chapter of 
this thesis will show.  
To summarize this chapter, it has become clear that there were many differences in the way the 
Tanzanian state wanted to develop its economy and rural areas, and how the Dutch and international 
institutions wanted to provide their aid. Despite the Dutch government admiring Nyerere’s 
intentions to develop the rural sites, most of the Dutch aid policy was geared towards large scale 
production and industrial assistance in Dar es Salam, goals that did not align at all with Tanzania’s 
ideals. The reason why Tanzania became such an important recipient of aid therefore remains 
partially unexplained. The peculiar situation was that the Netherlands by itself provided over 8% of 
all foreign aid for the country. This intensive partnership had to be based on some sort of reason. The 
ministry of Foreign Affairs appeared to argue that Tanzania’s government’s international policy and 
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respect for human rights were important reasons why the country was chosen. It is clear this did not 
remain to be the situation on the premise of economic ideals, because the idea on the way Tanzania 
wanted to spend the nation’s budget was not shared with the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs. The 
times when Nyerere methods conflicted with human rights did not affect the aid flow from the 
Netherlands. There have always been problems with the allocation of aid. In a sense, the Dutch 
approach usually seemed to go against the ideological wishes of the government. They focussed aid 
on big cash crop companies when subsistence farming was preferred by the TANU party, and moved 
to support rural peasants in desolate regions when the Tanzanian government was forced to stop 
doing so by external forces. Likewise, the majority of Dutch aid went into enabling industrial 
production in Dar es Salam, whilst the government discouraged the population of living there and 
working in this sector. Seeing this idea on purposeful deurbanization was a cornerstone in Nyerere’s 
Ujamaa ideology, it seems very illogical that the Dutch government would deliberately undermine 
the Tanzanian government’s ideas and completely operate on their own conditions inside the 
country. But the matter of fact is that the sources have shown, that despite reports constantly 
stressing the fact cooperation with the countries government needed to be improved this never 
really worked. In 2004 the evaluation verdict still brought up this problem, almost 40 years after 
Nyerere proposed his ideas. Lastly this chapter has shown that the Netherlands preferred to follow 
the line of policy that the World Bank and the IMF upheld. Economic deterioration in the current 
system, or dubious political policy in Tanzania never changed the way the Dutch approached the 
issue of development aid for the country. Only when Tanzania wasn’t able to repay its foreign debt, 
did the Dutch attitude change, by lowering the amount of aid that was given, and enlarging its 
influence on the countries macro-economic policy. That this would render the Tanzanian state even 
more incapable to provide services for its rural population was only realised after many existing 
structures and services had broken down, and life expectancy, access to clean water, food security 
and literacy rates had dropped. In short it can be said that the Dutch government put in a lot of effort 
to provide budget to aid Tanzania, but failed to or refused to take into account the political, 
institutional and demographic changes the country went through under Nyerere’s rule. It seems the 
Tanzanian political and economic situation was known of, but not really deemed of vital importance 
for making aid policies in the Netherlands for the state. The sources show that the Dutch ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and the Tanzanian government couldn’t align their goals and were therefore held 
back in what they tried to accomplish. Development aid policy is however not the only way the Dutch 
reception of the economic consequences of Ujamaa can be examined. The next two chapters will 
provide the additional information to enable me to draw a clear conclusion on the matter. 
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3. Reception of a novel society: how did the Dutch newspapers 
report on Ujamaa and its effects on the Tanzanian economy 
This chapter consists of two separate parts of primary research that will be combined and linked 
together to answer the third sub question. Even though the research has been conducted on two 
different fields, namely the media’s approach and reception and the political reaction, merging the 
two into one chapter will allow this thesis to present a cohesive a definite overview on the Dutch 
reaction in general. Presenting both pieces in one chapter allows me to draw a combined conclusion 
without having to separate the two approaches first. However, since both …. Have been conducted 
using different materials they will first each be explained and presented by their selves before being 
discussed and compared at the end of the chapter. In theory it is expected that the information on 
Tanzanian economy presented in the newspapers would be known to the ministry as well. Reversed, 
it is the classic task of the media to question the governments functioning on this matter if their 
efforts do not align with the actual situation there. Therefore the conclusions from the separate parts 
would not only complement each other, but also explain how the two fields interacted and 
influenced one another.  
3.1 Why newspapers were important for the main question 
The media has always fulfilled an important task as a means of control on government policy. Any 
questionable agreements, diplomatic actions, affairs or statements will always be examined in a 
country with free press. But even more so, newspapers provide insight in the public opinion and 
zeitgeist as a primary source. By critically investigating the ways these newspapers report about the 
Tanzanian policies, it can become clear how the opinion of the writers represents the national view 
on the matter. In addition, not only the contents and tone of the articles are of importance, but also 
the frequency in which they discuss the Tanzanian situation. If the articles are placed in a context of 
time and regard how the Tanzanian state was doing at the time, there is a possibility that it can 
become clear to what types of situations the Dutch state and the media responded. My assumption 
is that the reports on the country and its policies will be scarce and random. Since the development 
cooperation with the Tanzanian state was barely affected by the actual Tanzanian urbanisation 
policy, I can believe that the media would behave the same. Nevertheless, it will provide more insight 
in how important the developments in Tanzania were to the Dutch society and government, but also 
how much attention is given to partners with deviant policies in general. Therefore, the central 
question in this chapter will be, how did the Dutch newspapers report on Ujamaa and the Dutch-
Tanzanian relations. To answer this question in a satisfying way many local and national newspapers 
have been studied. The most outstanding and most relevant examples will be showcased in a 
chronological order. This is done so in this way because it provides insight in the ongoing process of 
changing public opinions. Every article will be treated as a primary source, taking the background of 
the newspaper and its identity in account. If done so correctly a clear picture of the reception of the 
Ujamaa policies will be the result. 
3.2 The positive era 
The first mention of Ujamaa in a Dutch newspaper surprisingly was already 4 years after the Arusha 
declaration. De Tijd (a predecessor to HP/De Tijd) published a short statement about a celebratory 
stamp in honour of 10 years of Tanganyika.172 It mentioned the fact that an Ujamaa village was 
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depicted on one of the stamps. These were being created all over the country at the time, and as per 
custom the stamps were created to showcase the national identity. It is remarkable that, despite the 
mention of the publishment of Nyerere’s speeches in a socialist newspaper, it took 4 years for any 
newspaper to report on the situation at all. To be fair, many African states gained independence and 
tried to establish their national policies and identities in this period, so the Tanzanian situation 
wasn’t unique in that sense. It was not the only socialist experiment in sub-Saharan Africa in general. 
Even though Nyerere’s approach was different than other states, since it was only the beginning 
there were not many outstanding things to report. The first proper mention of Nyerere’s ideas and 
the thoughts behind the Ujamaa policy was made a year later in 1972 when a documentary was 
broadcast on national television. This was an informative documentary on the situation in the 
country, what the daily life was like in Tanzania and how Nyerere envisioned his society. Some local 
newspapers announced the fact that the documentary would be broadcast later that day.  
The first report on the principles of Ujamaa came in a Surinam newspaper in the end of 1972.173 At 
the time Surinam was still a Dutch colony, but it was preparing for independence in this era. Hence 
the national newspaper and the local government showed extra interest in foreign political and 
economic systems. The population had to be informed on ways in which the national identity could 
be created and how the state could be organised. That is why the newspaper explored the 
possibilities by showcasing the policy of a country that had a similar economic background and 
sectoral divide. Both countries were dependant on the primary sector, had a similar soil quality and 
economic ideas. This was combined with the fact that the countries shared had a Christian 
background and a communal character. This could therefore be useful in forming the political and 
economic direction the country was supposed to take 3 years later. The uniqueness of the Tanzanian 
approach made it interesting material for the Surinam newspaper. That is why a sizable space was 
reserved on an article explaining the concept of Ujamaa. After the ideology has been explained the 
writer continues to go in more depth over the execution of the concept. The ideology is not 
questioned or attacked but the actual realisation of the policies provokes some criticism. The writer 
believes that poor planning and unqualified officials have let the country down in development, but 
he strongly believes in the potential of the Tanzanian project. The international community at this 
time still praised Nyerere’s concept and gladly supported the country, politically and economically. 
Surinam and the writer were in this sense not different at the time this was published.  
4 months later the first article in a Dutch newspaper on Ujamaa is published in De Tijd.174 Journalist 
Theo Ruyter writes an informative article on the situation there under the Ujamaa system, and how it 
affects the daily life of the Tanzanian population. He starts his work by citing a quote from Nyerere 
himself. The president voiced the idea that a lack of supply is undermining the principles of Ujamaa. 
Nyerere reaches out to ask id the population could start producing more consumption goods like 
meat and eggs and also cloth. His argument is that the exclusiveness of these goods makes them 
available only to the wealthy and therefore a cause of further inequality. Ruyter says that this is 
illustrative of the speeches of Nyerere and the way he wants to lead his country. The writer believes 
that Tanzania is one of the few states that actually want to make socialism work for the entire 
population, and that Nyerere keeps encouraging the population by explaining his visions of Ujamaa 
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and how the African socialism should be executed. Then Ruyter provides a general introduction to 
the idea of Ujamaa, noting that there are still many bumps along the way before the concept could 
work in the long run. He foresees economic and also a lot of juridical problems that have to be 
overcome. Then he goes into the policy of deurbanization and relocation. He explains that Nyerere’s 
principle is based on voluntary subjection of the population. If the disagree with the idea of Ujamaa 
they should be able to get a certain level of autonomy until positive effects and benefits will win 
them over. Rewards should always be the goal to get the Tanzanians to work within the system and 
live in an Ujamaa village. This paragraph seems a bit anachronistic given the fact that this article was 
written after the start of operation Dodoma in which the TANU government had already started 
forcefully moving residents, scaring them away with negative repercussions. Maybe the writer was 
still unaware of the start of this project. He goes on to describe a process of decentralisation creating 
more power and say for local governments. Just a year before however Nyerere dismantled the old 
system by replacing local governments by region commissioners.  
The second part treads into greater detail about national problems within the government and 
general bureaucracy itself. Because of Nyerere’s policy to keep salaries low, educated officials started 
to feel like they were severely underpaid for their competence leading them to leave, be 
unmotivated or most problematically try to make extra money in illegal ways. Corruption therefore 
became a growing problem, not only at lower levels but also at the top, despite or maybe even 
because of Nyerere’s efforts to combat it. Tanzanian university graduates were often very critical of 
the efforts of the TANU party according to Ruyter. They both felt like the government wasn’t moving 
fast enough in nationalising companies and wanted more extreme and socialist policies, or thy 
disagreed with the concept of Ujamaa entirely. This lead to a shortage in motivated scholars. They 
also critiqued the fact that the Tanzanian government tried to solve this by hiring foreign officials, 
demanding more Tanzanian experts to be employed instead. The writer concludes his article by 
stating that some policies work contradictive and that the government remains indecisive on many 
logistic problems. This, in short paints a picture of a new state with an interesting an honest 
approach, which needs to develop but isn’t without potential. 
The next mention is a year after the last, this time in a social democratic daily newspaper called Het 
Vrije Volk.175 It says that the upcoming may the first 1974 would not only be labour day but that it 
would also be declared ‘Tanzania day’. The writer explains that Tanzania takes a strong stance on not 
accepting aid when donors wanted influence in the country in return, as an answer to combat 
(neo)colonialism. The last chapter of this thesis has however shown that Tanzania did in reality 
accept a lot of aid during this period, and faced a lot of foreign influence in economic policy and 
urban planning for example. This is the first newspaper mentioning an aid initiative in which Dutch 
people can donate money so the Tanzanians could buy the materials they need for production. 
Different in this approach is that the Tanzanians would, in line with their government policy of self-
reliance, decide what kind of tools they would buy with the money. This was opposed to the old 
approach in which the things that were deemed necessary for the population were collected for 
them. In practice, this action was done in cooperation with the Tanzanian state which meant the 
state actually decided what they would get. This sort of shows the distance between the Dutch 
reporters looking at this state as an interesting novelty and the reality in the country itself. It seems 
natural that this social-democrat newspaper applauds Tanzania’s socialist efforts. 
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A year later the same newspaper contained another article on Tanzania.176 2 Years after the start of 
operation Dodoma, the newspaper gave a Dutch former missionary that had lived in Tanzania for 15 
years, the chance to defend the Ujamaa policies he supports. He has seen the change in Tanzania 
from a colonial state to a self-governed socialist state striving for self-reliance. The man, named Jan 
van Zeeland was a firm believer in the principles of Ujamaa. The Dutch Tanzanian used his space in 
the socialist newspaper to claim that trade deals are more important and useful for the country then 
development aid, and that he and his fellow villagers have accomplished several impressive feats. He 
believes their lives are humble and modest, but they do have access to a moving truck along with a 
usable road they constructed, so goods like soap, sugar and other commodities can be in stock. He 
however partially realised this with a gift from a Dutch organisation of 50000 to work on his project, 
which is an external source and on top of that a form of development aid, but the newspaper doesn’t 
critically pay attention to this fact. The resistance against to urbanisation plans and the deteriorating 
economic situation are described briefly, but in a relative it is clear that this article is created to paint 
the portrait of a peculiar and colourful Dutch man that wholeheartedly believes in African socialism. 
The writer ends the article with saying the Netherlands is going to allocate 33 million extra for the 
development of Tanzania after van Zeelands argument of Tanzania desperately needing trade deals, 
more so then aid.  
The first ten years since Nyerere declared his concept of Ujamaa, have seen little response from 
Dutch newspapers in general. The Tanzanian ideals are applauded and even though some problems 
with getting the state to function are mentioned in all the articles, it is clear that the writers have the 
best hopes for the state coming to a point where it would be self-reliant and able to fulfil its goals of 
general equality and health in the long run. Even though the measures of getting the Tanzanian 
population to comply became more repressive and the Dutch state started giving significant sums of 
money to Tanzania, newspapers did not feel the need to report or even comment on these matters. 
The drop in cash crop prices worldwide and periods of drought dealt a devastating blow to the 
Tanzanian economy in this period. The changing circumstances would raise expectations that the 
theme of the articles would change from a hopeful representation of a novel system to reports on 
the state Tanzania was in and how help and aid would be organised there.  
De Telegraaf is the first major national newspaper to report on Tanzania and Ujamaa in 1976, but the 
tone isn’t entirely serious.177 The title is ‘Joop in de tropen’ which translates to Joop in the tropics, 
referring to Joop den Uyl, the Dutch prime minister at the time. His visit to the country is described, 
without deeply going into the ideas of Ujamaa that shaped the country. The only note about the 
Tanzanian policy is that they resorted to forceful deurbanization, making this the first mention of 
this. The newspaper also points out that den Uyl is referred to as Ndungu, meaning comrade in 
Swahili, showcasing the socialist nature of both Tanzania and Den Uyl. 
The next mention of Ujamaa and Tanzanian urbanisation policies is again an informative article. NRC 
Handelsblad contains and article with a surprisingly positive title that freely translates to Ujamaa gets 
going, or Ujamaa is starting to work.178 This piece was created because it had been 10 years since the 
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Arusha Declaration. This article gives space to yet another former missionary to explain the positive 
achievements that have been made in 10 years of Ujamaa policies.  
Mister Franken, a Dutch emigrant and active member of the TANU-party argues that the Arusha 
Declaration has prevented colonial corruption and abuse of power that prevailed in many other 
African states. He describes Nyerere’s harsh stance on corruption and greed, and he explains that he 
is more popular among his lower officials then with the higher ones because he prevents them for 
enriching themselves. Furthermore, Franken claims that Nyerere is popular with the army, so that 
these factors solidify him in power. He blames the practical shortcomings of the system on a lack of 
knowledge in the country. The smart educated capitalist Tanzanians wouldn’t want to work with the 
system, and the socialists were too radical and tried to do impossible reforms in a very short time. 
This showcases a problem that is present in the articles in many Dutch newspapers. Tanzania was 
unable to educate officials to a certain point because there was no financial incentive to achieve 
these positions. Furthermore, the educational reforms led to a drop in people being able to learn the 
needed qualities. In this way, the Dutch newspapers as a whole showcase a pattern in which 
Tanzania in unable to train qualified officials whilst being increasingly dependent on them to run a 
system that discourages people from trying to work in these positions. Franken does note that 
without Ujamaa, Tanzania could have been torn in civil war with supressed and poor minority groups. 
Nyerere did a good job in unifying the country in his eyes. Former missionary and father Van 
Amelsvoort is the second Dutch Tanzanian that was asked for his opinions in this article. He 
concludes that TANU-officials have disregarded the feelings of rural Tanzanians too much, and that 
they may have used too much armed violence, which caused collateral damage. He however believes 
that these were excesses, and that this period is over. This is probably also because most of the 
movements have already been conducted at this point but neither the journalist nor the father 
reflect on this. He pleads for more autonomy for villages and decentralisation. He feels that Ujamaa 
could still be successful if the villages could decide the extent to which they want to go with the 
national policies. Finally, expert Van Mansveld is questioned in the last part of the article. He 
illustrates the same point of a good concept that is held back by bad luck and a lack of 
knowledgeable officials. He does note that the civil service sector worked better than in other African 
countries, which is very debatable. It is noteworthy that no journalists or Tanzanians that have been 
spoken have criticized the concept of Ujamaa and its economic implications. They show practical 
problems with the approach but never question the concept itself. This article is again informative 
but not critical. At this point Tanzania had started to become the largest Sub-Saharan African 
recipient of aid and one of the important development cooperation partners. One would expect that 
there would be more inquiries how the country was actually governed and if the concept was good 
enough to be executed.  
The next mention of Tanzanian economics in a Dutch newspaper is an important one. A newspaper 
from the overseas area of Curacao briefly reports on the policy of the World Bank to give 11 billion 
for the realisation of a system of local village councils in 1977.179 What is so important about this is 
that the World Bank gives this giant sum of money for the development of something they actively 
try to revert and blame Tanzania for 5 years later. This news article was based on a report that the 
Dutch ministry published. This was however the only newspaper that deemed this to be newsworthy. 
Furthermore, there naturally is no criticism or deeper investigation in this short piece. The 
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indecisiveness of the Tanzanian state also shines through in this. The wanted to take power from 
village leaders and give it to regional managers, but accept aid to strengthen the local councils. This 
all seems quite contradictory. At this time, the country receives aid for strengthening industrial 
sectors that can only work at low capacity, whilst the company tries to focus on collectivising 
agricultural production for which they get very little help. It almost seems like Nyerere’s plans are 
applauded but disregarded in terms of aid policy. Newspapers only report on the way the country 
works but not on what results this gives and what it means for economic partners.  
Het Nederlands dagblad is the next entry.180 This is a protestant Christian newspaper with a relatively 
small number of readers that are mostly reformed protestants and confessional voters. Tanzania is a 
relatively popular topic for socialist newspapers because of its policies, but it was also mentioned 
multiple times in Christian newspapers because of their emphasis on collecting aid for this Christian 
country because of the ‘love thy neighbour’ principle. The article starts off with a claim from Nyerere 
that it is still the time to sow for Tanzania. The state is still far from being able to reap the fruits of 
the government’s efforts since the country is facing lots of problems and still has a long way to go in 
development. The economy has not come to bloom yet and he believes all officials are still trying 
their hardest to realise his goals for the country. The newspaper then confirms the point of view that 
African states are judged in the international community on their diplomatic policies and alignments 
instead of the way they rule the country in general. This was very prevalent in what countries 
received aid and from which states. Tanzania was a popular country for its diplomatic stance and the 
country strongly voicing an ideal of striving to provide civil service to the poor in rural areas as much 
as possible. They received aid regardless of how they actually tried to make their policies work. This 
article makes a promise to look at the way in which the country tries to realise the ideals in a critical 
manner, and is the first in doing so. This was however a small newspaper so its impact remained 
small. It starts this investigation by looking at Nyerere’s concept of democracy. Because he believed 
that everyone in the country should strive for the same goal, he argued that multiple parties would 
only divide the country and distract from the work that needed to be done in cohesion. His idea of 
democracy would be letting the population choose between two candidates for a position for a 
TANU official. He furthermore states that it is not worrisome that his ideas are not working yet. This 
is where the journalist takes a new approach. He questions if the ideas of Nyerere are achievable at 
all to begin with. The overall effectiveness of his policies is questioned, even in a relative light. He 
says that Nyerere is admirable and that his international praise is understandable but should not be 
done on basis of his economic achievements, or rather lack thereof. This article was written before 
the negative conclusions of Hyden, and was therefore ahead of its time in that sense. After this 
article, other newspapers would start to become increasingly critical of Nyerere. The main tone 
however is one of understanding for Nyerere and the TANU party, seeing that the path they are 
taking is hard, and there is a lot of praise for his moderate attitude.  
The next article was written two years later and published in Het Vrije Volk.181 The timing of this 
article is yet again interesting because it was written in the transition period where in the 
international spheres enthusiasm for the Ujamaa project was starting to change into dissatisfaction 
and disappointment. Tanzania’s army had started getting involved in the conflict within Idi Amin’s 
Uganda. This together with extreme drought, the collapsing world market for crops and the oil crisis 
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gave a new reason for the paper to report on the state of the Ujamaa project. Journalist Frits Baarda 
describes how these negative circumstances have forced Tanzania to drift away from their doctrine 
and ask for development aid in whichever way possible. Baarda explains that Tanzania deals with a 
giant shortage of fuels and resources on one side which leads the country to have to import many 
materials. On the other hand, Tanzania has little exportable goods of value, and a flawed and 
inefficient system of pricing for the foreign market. Most things that Tanzania can produce are not 
popular on the world market. He claims the truth is that at the time the economy was just not doing 
well at all. He takes a descriptive approach illustrating how a shortage in machinery and expertise is 
damaging a fragile economy. Another alarming point he brings forward is that the villages are unable 
the products donors want to see produced in return for their money. He goes on to explain that the 
fixed government export prices are too low, leading Tanzanians to start producing for the black 
market instead. Luxury goods like batteries, radio’s and tomatoes cannot be in stores anymore, just 
like medicine that is not available for the average Tanzanian, despite all government efforts to 
provide healthcare for the rural population. The writer believes Tanzania has been able to generate 
much goodwill by its participation against Idi Amin but damaged its economy in the process. A 
featured Dutch hotel owner in Tanzania pulls the alarm at well saying that 8 out of 13 hotels that 
were built with Dutch money are making huge losses. Baarda concludes that Nyerere has only been 
able to give everyone equal amounts of poverty instead of wealth. 
3.3 The negative era 
The NRC and the Amigoe newspaper from Curacao both publish the same stories that originally 
appeared in the NRC in June of 1981.182 They give some pages for three reports on Tanzania. These 
are the first openly critical reports on Tanzania at that. The title of the first article leaves little room 
for doubt. It actually says that the third way is not working. The writer reports on his visit of the 
country. This provides a new viewpoint compared to other papers up until then because they were 
either written by outsiders or adepts of the Ujamaa policy. He compares the situation in Tanzania to 
his earlier visit. The writer starts by describing the state Dar es Salam is in as shockingly terrible. 
There is an overall shortage of food, services and resources, there is no power and broken things are 
not repaired anymore. Taxis overprice heavily because they need to buy their gasoline on the black 
market and the roads are broken and neglected. This seems in line with the Tanzanian government 
moving services from the capital to other places and stopping the replacement of them by 
discontinuing them altogether in the city to discourage citizens to migrate to there. After this the 
writer continues to portray a picture of a country with a giant incapable bureaucracy. A forgotten 
stamp in a passport leads to 15 officials jointly doing nothing while over 30 people are waiting for 
service at one time. He writes that the experts in Dar es Salam know that they cannot blame the 
state of the country on crisis and bad luck (drought, oil prices) which is done often, but that it only 
worsened the situation. The writer instead believes that the size of the workforce in civil service and 
the incompetent SOE’s are the true and most important cause of the deterioration of the Tanzanian 
economy. He compares Tanzania to its capitalist neighbour Kenya where at the time all prices were 
lower and wages higher. This is his prove that Ujamaa policy actually held the country back instead of 
helping it forward. He closes off with a worrisome report by the World Bank that predicts that the 
Tanzanian would continue to shrink against a fast-growing population in the 90’s. The next of the 
three articles comments on the black market that has grown in the Tanzanian economy because of 
all its restrictions. The first notable word that is used is tragedy. This is drastic and remarkable 
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difference compared to the articles that were written 5 years earlier. The article describes how bad 
of a job Tanzania is doing at controlling and organising its markets, and how corruption and 
smuggling contain a bigger business. He describes how free healthcare and low salaries have in fact 
made the care unavailable to the Tanzanians. They force the employees to work around the system 
to make money, making it more expensive. Moreover, there is a great lack of available medicine. The 
pharmacies, clinics and schools have been built for all the villages but the buildings are empty.  
The last article focusses on the SOE’s and how they are not functioning properly at the time of 
writing. Especially the agricultural collectivisation and redistribution (within the country and as 
export) lost too much money on bureaucracy (50 to 60% of revenue per crop) to keep the system 
running. The problems with redistribution are far greater than the government suspected. On top of 
that the writer states that they had a poor grasp on how to manage prices and markets leading to 
poverty and hunger. Overall these articles come off with a very different tone compared to the 
optimistic pieces in the 1970’s. They do not however link this to the way the Dutch government is 
dealing with the management of the Tanzanian state.  
A year later the overall tone of the next article about Ujamaa is yet again negative.183 It must be 
noted that it was De Telegraaf in which it was published, which is known as a right-wing paper. But 
the article seems the follow the same trail of thought as the last entry. The writer explains that 
Nyerere’s approach is seen as too dogmatic by donor states and that they are about done with giving 
him praise. He rules a one-party state and the news that he had been forcefully moving people to 
achieve his deurbanization and relocation plans for nine years has reached the reporter as well. The 
journalist contacts the Tanzanian ambassador in the Netherlands, whom he portrays as a tragic figure 
because of his poor physical health, comparing it to the Tanzanian state that has been struck with 
bad luck as well. The ambassador gets a chance to defend the policies in the country but the article 
ends quite abruptly afterwards without the writer reacting on the ambassador’s words or concluding 
the story. The entire story aims to make the Tanzanian situation seem tragic.  
Two years later De Telegraaf takes the critique on the Tanzanian state yet one step further and 
outright judges former prime minister Joop den Uyl for visiting a socialist conference in the countries 
capital.184 The writer tries to portray the country as a dictatorial anti-Semitic regime that is not even 
allowed to join the socialist conference it hosts because of its one-party system. He starts of by 
stating that Nyerere’s stance on Israel means that he does not want Jews in his country in a rather 
informal fashion that is seen more often in De Telegraaf. This article showcases the most negative 
tone so far, the vast amount of critique seems very sudden and much more negative compared to all 
other reports. The writer claims that Nyerere is notorious for disregarding human rights and that he 
threatened to starve villages on purpose (for which no source is provided and of which I could find no 
proof). The text is accompanied by images of starving children and all titles are negative (for example 
Israeli’s not welcome and unholy Ujamaa concept). Furthermore, he explains the urbanisation 
policies as a punishment for the population, also criticising the concept that everyone has to 
contribute to the wellbeing of the village by working. He sees Nyerere as stubborn, upholding a 
concept that has ‘failed miserably’. Besides this, the writer Sibolt van Ketel keeps bringing up that 
Nyerere punishes villages by starving them and ends his article with a claim that the country is very 
corrupt. The tone of this article is so drastically different from any other older report on the subject 
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that it must be considered that the goal of the article might not be to provide a critical look at how 
Tanzania is doing economically. There is little to no link to how the Dutch government should 
respond to this, or how their policy towards this country should be. The international socialist parties 
are however criticized for holding a convention there however. That leads me to believe given the 
background of the newspaper that it wants to put the socialists in a bad light, using the more dubious 
aspects of the practice of Nyerere’s policies to paint a picture of a horrible country with whom Den 
Uyl and the socialists wrongly sympathise. It is however noteworthy that every article since 1978 has 
been increasingly critical on not only the execution but also the concept of Ujamaa. This ties in with 
the economic deterioration of the country but also by the Dutch political climate become more right-
wing and less idealistic after cabinet Den Uyl. It seems clear that the newspapers sympathy for 
Nyerere and his plans have decreased a lot.  
A year later a news update in the former communist newspaper De Waarheid gave a different 
story.185 The paper that had only 12000 subscribers at the time published a short message about an 
interview Nyerere had had with the Norwegian media. This newspaper has always been different in 
what kind of news it published, which explains why it suddenly held an article on Nyerere when other 
newspapers didn’t. The Tanzanian president did a mea culpa, admitting that he made some mistakes 
in his economic approach and the execution of his Ujamaa plans. This resentful attitude has been 
shown in many documentaries and books about Tanzania, but received little to no attention in the 
traditional Dutch media. In the Norwegian interview, Nyerere admits that the abolishment of private 
corporations and total collectivisation of agriculture have been mistakes because the economy was 
not strong enough to handle this. Contrarily Nyerere still avidly defends the movement of people and 
the principles of Ujamaa, as he feels this united the country and was indeed the best way to provide 
facilities and service for all Tanzanians. Nyerere adds that Tanzania has been at a disadvantage from 
the start and that his socialist plans would have worked better in an already developed country since 
it would be better suited for it. He believes nobody expected Tanzania to become wealthy and 
developed within 18 years, and that striving to make things better has been hard. He feels that 
Tanzania indeed has become too dependent on foreign assistance but that the situation made it 
inevitable.  
In 1987, the local newspaper from Leeuwarden, read mostly in the province of Friesland reserved 
space for telling the story of a Frisian man that moved to Tanzania to teach about agricultural 
techniques and coordinate production there.186 His Millingano institute is a project designed to aid 
cattle holders in Tanzania in ensuring good production and making profits. The article tries to show 
the extraordinary type of work the man has to do there. The writer emphasises how much work the 
Frisian expat needs to do to lift the production area up to the necessary standard. Afterwards 
Nyerere resigned voluntarily and opened Tanzania up for democratic reforms. This marked the end 
of the Ujamaa project since the World Bank and other multilateral foreign investors got to decide on 
how the country’s economic policy would be shaped. This is also where newspapers stopped 
reporting on the state of the country. The last and most recent mention of Ujamaa came from 
1991.187 This newspaper contains a report on a conference about development aid that was visited 
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by former minister of development cooperation Jan Pronk, and notes that former president Nyerere 
was a remarkable sight and speaker there. Ujamaa is described as a middle ground between 
socialism and capitalism. The writer continues by saying that the one-party state is a phenomenon 
that is dying out, with this political structure crumbling everywhere, more likely so when under 
influence of international organisations and western countries. Nyerere claims in his speech that 
democratisation is a positive thing when it occurs naturally, but not under pressure of the 
International monetary fund or other states. He deems direct democratisation along with economic 
detachment of Africa from former colonisers as an impossible concept. Nyerere pleads for more pan-
African cooperation and trade. Pronk himself is also quoted in this article, saying that this was a time 
where poverty reduction was very difficult, and that this period is characterised by much conflict and 
resistance.  
Overall it can be stated that, keeping in mind the fact that Tanzania was the Netherlands most 
important recipient of aid in Africa, the Dutch media paid remarkably little attention to Nyerere and 
the conditions in Tanzania. Approximately once every year did a newspaper report on the situation in 
Tanzania, and never did one question the cashflows from and bilateral agreements with the 
Netherlands. It is however clearly noticeable that the overall tone and content of the articles 
drastically changed over 25 years. Most articles kept having an informative nature but hopeful 
curiosity changed into harsh criticism when the public discourse on developing nations in general, 
and the international appreciation of Nyerere’s social and economic efforts plummeted.188 This 
turning point was at the end of the 1970’s. The first articles did not deny the fact that Tanzania’s road 
to development would be hard, and that there were major problems that needed to be resolved, but 
the overall tone was positive paired with lots of praise for the teacher Nyerere that tried his best to 
shape a good society for all Tanzanians instead of enriching himself and his friends. The striking 
difference is that after the 1980’s Nyerere is portrayed as a cruel dictator, whose flawed ideas on 
economics led the whole nation to crippling poverty. The truth is never truly one way or the other, 
but it is interesting to note that the newspaper like to deal with the country in extremes to make for 
an interesting story. The most nuanced stories were often told by the missionaries and expats that 
were interviewed by the journalists. Writers that were not in the country have a choice of two 
narratives, either present the positive story or a negative one. This shows in the way they deal with 
the urbanisation policies and their effects as well. They either pick a positive approach, emphasising 
Nyerere’s reassuring words that people can move in the tempo they want to, and praising his 
moderate and pragmatic approach. These articles almost never make mention of the forced 
migrations, that were happening already at the time that most articles were written. All mentions of 
this but one (which sees someone convincing the reader that those instances were excesses of 
wrongly executed policy and have been stopped for years) were not made in these positive articles. 
At the same time, criticism on the forced migration only started appearing after most of it had been 
done years ago. The sudden need to showcase this whilst the knowledge was available long 
beforehand, points in the direction that writers used this information to deliberately convey a 
negative image of the countries policies and Julius Nyerere. This strict divide in the approach towards 
the urbanisation policies seems baffling since the all articles were informative in nature, either 
presenting an international news item or describing the uniqueness of the Tanzanian economic 
system. The reaction of the media aligns with the governments. The Dutch journalists gloss over all 
policy flaws regarding human rights and economic failure for 12 years, then make a sudden one-
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eighty and start judging the country for all its policies, just like the World Bank. Seeing as the 
economic decline had started long before and could probably have been predicted long before, there 
again seems to be no actual trigger to pinpoint as a cause of this change of heart. It seems the 
reaction to policy is several years delayed, despite the information being there. The second part of 
this analysis will however provide these answers 
3.4 Contents of the archive 
Now that the results of the first part of the research have been presented, it is time to explain in 
what way the correspondence between the Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs and the embassy in 
Tanzania showed the Dutch reaction to the Tanzanian policies. The national archive in The Hague has 
saved over 5 meters of documents regarding the embassy in Tanzania. To answer this question, I 
searched through the data from this archive to fish out the important pieces of correspondence that 
shed a light on the relation between the embassy and the ministry of Foreign Affairs, and in what 
way the ministry reacted to the situations in Tanzania in name of the Dutch government. The 
conclusions of the other two questions would point towards lack of coordination between the 
embassy and the ministry of Foreign Affairs. The embassy would be the most reliable source on the 
political and economic developments inside the country. If there was a sufficient amount of reports 
and material to work with, the Dutch government would be able to tune its policies on development 
aid in Tanzania to the type of economy and political system that was in state there. It has been 
presented before in this thesis that the types of development often did not correspond with the 
Tanzanian government’s wishes, and that the Dutch government followed the line of the World Bank 
in its judgment of the social accomplishments and economic policies of the state, instead of drawing 
its own conclusions. This implicates that the reports on the country were either not available, 
partially disregarded or deemed less important than the information of the World Bank. Looking at 
the sheer size of everything that has been saved inside the archive it seems like there was no lack of 
correspondence or material at all. Unfortunately, only the documents until 1974 are available. 
However, using the material can still shed a light on the question how the ministry reacted on the 
letters and documents that were sent from the embassy. Did internal changes in the country affect 
the correspondence, and in what ways did the state inquire on these changes. Even though the 
newspapers started formulating their criticism after 1978, the economic deterioration had already 
set in years before. The ambassador must have been up to date with this occurrence. Hence the 
reaction of the government to these findings is vital in figuring out how they constructed their policy 
regarding Tanzania. Also, it is interesting to see what the government would possibly consider 
problematic and what not. In this sense, this research can illustrate exactly how the Dutch state 
responded to the developments in Tanzania regarding their Ujamaa politics. 
To start analysing the contents of the archive, firstly it is wise to examine the index. By looking at the 
table of contents a lot of things can become clear. What kind of material was sent, what kind of 
material was collected and saved and how much material there is in general are important indicators 
to examine the relation between the embassy and the ministry. The first noticeable fact about this 
archive is that so much material has been saved. There is a very wide range of types of documents, 
letters, printed telegrams, newspaper articles, reports, protocol and various types of other 
information. This archive was built by combining the efforts of two separate archivers that have 
preserved and collected everything over the years. 387 separate folders have been created, carefully 
organised by subject. It can be argued that if the government wouldn’t have cared about the 
correspondence with the embassy, they wouldn’t have put in so much effort in storing and 
organising all the documents. The state in which everything has been saved, despite the documents 
being over 40 years old showcases the care and effort that was put into dealing with this material. 
This makes the assumption that the government would ignore or disregard all the mail they got seem 
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highly unlikely. The archive has been divided in 9 different subjects. These are general, organisation, 
protocol, judicial matters, matters of public order, water, transport and electronics, economy, 
migration and labour, social matters, cultural and educational matters and finally state, defence and 
international organisations.189 Out of these the documents about economy, social matters and state 
and defence appear to be most relevant. Especially the latter because I found it contains year reports 
and correspondence by letters between the embassy and the ministry in the Netherlands. News 
about government staff changes, changing laws and other political decisions were all reported on by 
the embassy and sent to the base at the ministry. Between 1961 and 1974 a lot of these documents 
have been read and judged by of officials in the Netherlands. Key in finding out how the news about 
policy changes in Tanzania was received is not only looking at what was sent, but how the ministry 
reacted upon receiving said information. Inquiries on extra information or letters about Dutch policy 
changes would be very insightful. I have selected the most important examples of this 
correspondence between the ministry and the embassy, sometimes referring to a folder as a whole, 
and sometimes picking out specific letters that seem to be particularly important or illustrative.  
3.5 Economy, migration and labour 
The first archive material that will be discussed are reports about the economic development of 
Tanzania.190 Between the Arusha Declaration in 1967 and 1972, the ambassador’s reports and 
updates on the Tanzanian economic situation have been collected for the national archive. 
Unfortunately, no material on this matter was available after 1972, which is before operation 
Dodoma started and the shortages of food started occurring. These economic reports therefore 
don’t really affect the policy changes when the economic results of Ujamaa started to become worse.  
It can however be seen that the period between 1967 and 1972 seems to be characterised by a 
combination of slow economic growth and fast population growth. The rural population still 
maintained a relatively large production at the time, so food imports were not necessary yet. The 
ambassador continuously voiced his concerns to the Dutch government about the amount of food 
and goods that can be produced. Lots of reports in the archive indicated an agricultural output that 
was too low to be sustainable, considering the rapid growth of the population. On the grander 
concept of the entire economy, the reports the ambassador sent were moderately positive, even 
though they show that the problems the economy faced were starting to grow rapidly. In 1971 and 
1972 the ambassador noted that the balance of payments was increasingly becoming skewed but 
that there was some form of economic development. Some months saw better results than others, 
but the vast amount of exports and total production was rising up until at least 1972. To achieve this 
growth large imports had to be made. Tanzania was therefore encouraged by western donors like 
the Netherlands to loan money to import machinery and capital. The ambassador however saw risk 
and danger in these developments and therefore put much emphasis on the fact that Tanzania could 
not possibly produce at a higher capacity at the time. Any further imports of raw materials or capital 
would be a waste of money since it could not be produced, manufactured or put to use. On top of 
that machinery and other forms of mechanical capital this lose their value over time or break. The 
Tanzanians would not be able to repair more advanced machinery, or would not have the resources 
to do so. This approach therefore did not work in the long run. Industrial goods that could be 
produced did not align with the demand of the international market and were as a result sold under 
the normal value. However, despite the embassy warning about this problem as early as in the first 5 
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years after the Arusha Declaration, delivering technical assistance and machinery remained a main 
way of providing development aid for Tanzania by the Dutch government. The archive furthermore 
contains financial predictions of the costs of the movement of the nation’s capital to Dodoma and 
the new buildings that were going to be built. The Dutch ministry did not comment on the costs, 
urgency and usefulness of this project. In fact, this archive contains little reaction or inquiries by the 
Dutch government at all. 
3.6 Aid and assistance 
Archive numbers 161 to 217 are about the Dutch policy in providing economic and technical 
assistance to the country.191 Number 163 in particular contains some interesting documents.192 The 
first thing that stands out in the folder is a letter directed to the ministry from 1968. In that year the 
ambassador felt like he had to inquire about the Dutch aid projects that were done in Tanzania 
because he was not told of them or involved in the coming to be of them. He did not receive 
response to this letter however. The problem of the lack of substantial communication continued 
over the years. There has for example been a very interesting correspondence of letters between the 
ambassador and the Dutch government (ministry of Foreign Affairs) in the beginning of April 1971. 
The ambassador claimed that the Dutch way of dividing aid among solitary projects caused confusion 
for officials, that it was way too much work at once bureaucratically to handle for the Tanzanian 
bureaucracy and aside from that, the policies lacked integration and therefore long-term vision. The 
ambassador voiced his concerns in an official letter, hoping for a response and a change of policy 
form the Dutch ministry. The accusations were however all parried by the ministry, by saying the 
Tanzanian minister of finance was in so much trouble managing the countries balance of payments 
that he would accept any form of aid regardless of how it suited the countries policy. The letter 
actually said Amir Jamal, the Tanzanian minister of finance was in no position to say no to any aid, 
and therefore the ministry saw no reason to change anything. On the subject of the discussion, the 
ministry ensured the embassy that they had been clear enough, and did not understand the 
misunderstandings at all. The unclearness was in the eye of the beholder. The distance between the 
ambassador that was living in Tanzania and having contact with the officials there, and the Dutch 
government becomes very clear in this way. The government showed no intention of considering the 
wishes of the Tanzanian state and its officials, and acts according to the conviction that they know 
what’s best for the development of regions there. In practice, creating developmental policy from 
the drawing board has proven to be hard to make effective. The Dutch ministry has shown in its 
letter that it considered the opinion of its own employees in The Hague more important than that of 
the embassy in Tanzania. The rest of the folder consists mostly of declarations of how much money 
will be made available for projects, but no evaluation of them. The ambassador included Tanzanian 
sources like newspapers and other documents praising the Dutch attitude towards providing 
development aid, them making a budget to assist the government in training its citizens and the 
Dutch aiming towards booking long term results instead of instant hunger alleviation. The Dutch 
however usually design their own projects within the country without consolidation.  
The next folder regarding the developmental policy mostly consists of documents regarding the loans 
to the Tanzanian government.193 Some documents in there clearly state that the Netherlands was not 
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willing to grant grace when repayments couldn’t be paid back, but rather wanted to decide on ad hoc 
basis which parts of the loan actually had to be paid back depending on the situation. Whilst this 
stance was perfectly acceptable considering the fact it were loans, and that it considered a sizeable 
amount of money, it did however leave Tanzania guessing weather they actually were supposed to 
pay back the loans until the Dutch government came to collect the money. This complicates the 
making of policy for the Tanzanian ministries, especially considering the fact that Tanzania suffered 
under a not so capable financial bureaucracy as explained in the previous chapters.  
The next folder with content worth examining closer contains the last documents up until 1974.194 
The other folders in this part of the archive only contain technical information but show no signs of 
interaction. In general, only content up until 1974 is available and saved in this archive. On 26th of 
March 1974 an interesting letter was sent from the ministry to Tanzania. The content of the letter 
showed that the ministry of Foreign Affairs seemed to have caught on to the dynamics of Tanzania 
better. The letter contained more information on Ujamaa and how it should be considered in actually 
cooperating with the government. Overall it seemed that the ministry was focussed a lot more on 
Tanzania and its policies. The contents showed that the Tanzanian government had asked for 
projects to be integrated better and to be specifically developed for the Ujamaa system that was only 
now explained in the letter, 7 years after its introduction. The Dutch government apparently agreed 
on the Tanzanian policy that rural development should be prioritised over urban development, and 
was willing to comply with the way Tanzania wanted to see its received aid directed. The focus would 
also be mostly redirected on providing infrastructure throughout the country so the rural areas could 
be supplied easier, and furthermore providing assistance in the small-scale industrial production the 
country was trying to set up. It would however turn out that Tanzania wouldn’t have the resources to 
keep these industries running and maintain the roads. Personal letters from the embassy that will be 
discussed later as well as the economic reports made very clear that Tanzania outright lacked 
resources to run its industries and services everywhere. The Tanzanian government asked for 
assistance in every field possible because of their lack of trained officials (that want to work in the 
country for the government or its daughter companies) and monetary funds. It proved to be very 
hard to divide wealth and provide services in a country with low production and a lack of sustainable 
economic growth. Even though some efforts have been made to coordinate the aid flow with the 
Tanzanian government and its ideas towards the middle of the 70’s, a discrepancy remained 
between the Tanzanian wishes and what Dutch officials deemed best for the country. This entire part 
of the archive is best illustrated by a final letter sent by the ambassador who once again showed his 
concern about the gap between what Tanzanians actually needed, wanted and expected and the sort 
of projects the Dutch government offered. He tries to explain that these worlds need more 
integration and that the Dutch ministry should aim to do so in the future. This letter was however 
once again left unanswered. 
3.7 Other correspondence  
The final and most important documents for answering the sub question are grouped together in the 
archive. Files 230 to 234 among other things, contain personal letters about political developments in 
Tanzania, and also economic and political year reports on the developments in the country.195 These 
files are vital in examining how the Dutch government reacted after being provided with this 
information. Also, the majority of the correspondence between the ministry and the embassy was 
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saved in these folders. Folder 230 contains all the pieces that were archived regarding the 
ambassador’s comments on the political developments in Tanzania from 1965 to 1972.196 The folder 
is filled with newspaper cut-outs, letters, reports, parts of Nyerere’s speeches and many other 
sources. If anything, this vast amount of archive material shows that the ambassador at the time was 
very diligent in making sure all information ended up in The Hague at the ministry of Foreign Affairs. 
Most of the important correspondence for the research that has been saved, by coincidence is from 
1972. That is why most of the attention will go to that part of the folder. The first documents are 
mostly certain extracts from Nyerere’s speeches to showcase the direction the nation’s president 
wanted to go with his country. The names of the officials that shape Nyerere’s government are also 
noted and sent to the ministry. The first elaborate letter in the folder from the ambassador was 
written on the 25th of October 1968 after the Arusha Declaration, and it contains a comprehensive 
explanation of Tanzania’s national and international political intentions. The ambassador elucidated 
about Nyerere’s warnings against other countries not to interfere in the nation’s politics. The 
president had just done this on purpose to send of a signal, and to reemphasize the nation’s 
independence. Besides that, the ambassador explained the changes in Nyerere’s approach to realise 
his Ujamaa goals. Furthermore, the letter provided explanation for new status quo Nyerere enforced 
regarding his ideas on democracy and freedom of expression. Nyerere wanted to assure that there 
was freedom of speech on all political levels, but that this freedom would end after decisions had 
been made. Citizens at this point were supposed and expected to have ‘discipline’ and accept the 
situation and act out what is ordered. In other words, critique beforehand was fine, afterwards not. 
Nyerere granted his officials the right to discipline opposition in ‘traditional fashion’ a term so vague 
it could be explained by officers as outright physical violence. The ambassador explained that the 
new developments should be watched closely and examined cautiously as Tanzania was becoming 
increasingly autocratic. The Dutch government did not seem to mind however, since no specific 
reaction to this was sent back. And as the last chapter has shown, Nyerere was applauded for his 
pragmatic non-dictatorial approach in the Dutch newspapers, the first sight of critique on Nyerere’s 
ideas on democracy would not appear in them for at least the next five years. Another interesting 
thing to note is that the ambassador predicted these happenings ten days earlier in another shorter 
letter. It seems that the embassy was very capable of judging the political and economic situations in 
the country.  
On the fourth of February 1972, the ambassador was inquired in name of Prince Claus to write about 
some positive changes in Tanzania in an informative fashion. The inquiry specifically asked for 
positive facts to counter the negative messages the Dutch government had apparently received from 
external sources. Maybe some nuance from inside the country was needed to balance the negative 
news, or otherwise the ministry could have wanted to be able to portray the good changes that were 
being made in Tanzania, partially because of the Dutch support that had been given. On the same 
day, a more official document was sent along, with the same question now explaining what news 
motivated the ministry to issue the inquiry in name of the prince. The document was sent on the 
basis that there was a notion of a negative shift in attitude towards the Asian population in the 
country and that the available economic numbers seemed dangerously bad. It is noteworthy that not 
the economic reports sent by the embassy fuelled the need to make this inquiry, but rather that an 
external news source was the cause. Also, the amount of corruption was questioned, along with 
conflicts of race. The ambassador responded to this inquiry by explaining that most concerns that he 
had not already voiced were not as big or urgent as they might have come across to the ministry. The 
problem of the Asian community was a result of Nyerere’s socialist policy of restricting the economic 
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benefits of renting out housing since it was not deemed as a fair way of making money. Since many 
rentable houses in Dar es Salam were owned by residents of Asian descent, they were generally 
more heavily affected by this policy. This led to the ultimate departure of some of them. This was 
wrongly explained by some sources at a specific policy to target the Asian minority but the 
ambassador ensured this was not the case, just as racial tensions in general. He provided some 
positive economic news as asked for, but he also noted that the economic situation was indeed very 
risky.  
Six days later the ambassador sent another letter from the embassy.197 This letter provided 
elaboration on the economic situation in Tanzania that seemed to worry the ministry in the 
beginning of 1972. The letter contained tables with the countries net import and export numbers. 
The ambassador explained in detail how this came to be. He believed the start of the long-term 
development projects that were supported by the Dutch government led to an increase in imports 
and a shortage in foreign and Tanzanian finance. Jamal, the minister of finance vowed to try to solve 
this problem as fast as possible. The ambassador warned the ministry that he agrees with Jamal on 
the fact that Tanzania should focus on short term projects, first of all increasing exports. Their 
exports have suffered and dropped severely because of the global decline in price for many cash 
crops that Tanzania tried to sell, especially the agricultural product sisal. The ambassador wrote that 
the minister should know that in terms of development, the maximum had been achieved with the 
current balance of payments and productivity. Looking back on this time, this seems to be a 
reoccurring problem. The desperate need to keep developing, lead the focus to be on expensive 
imports and large sums of government money to facilitate needs nationwide, whilst the economic 
energy to generate necessary money for moving forwards was not present. The ambassador also 
refers back to the inquiry from the ministry, by providing some explanation on corruption in Tanzania 
as well. The extensive letter says, that whilst corruption is a problem, it does not reflect on the 
business ethic of working Tanzanians, especially compared to other African countries. Corruption 
mostly existed because of the strict government regulations. The ambassador also noted an 
important new point and that is that the changes in approach in education also catered to a 
government need. The state believed too many young educated men and women wanted ‘white 
collar jobs’ in the city, nevertheless not being qualified enough to outclass the current workers and 
therefore remaining unemployed. That is why the government changed its educational framework to 
focus on practical skills in agriculture and industries instead. In this sense however, the Tanzanian 
educational system became out of touch with the international agreements and became non-
transferable leading to a brain-drain of the rich and some officials and their children to other 
countries.  
In the period after this the embassy kept emphasizing the problems about the economic situation 
whenever possible. A good example of this is the instance when another letter was sent from the 
embassy about a meeting between Nyerere and his parliament.198 The president decided to offer to 
step down from his position because the ideals he wanted to see were not realised fast enough, and 
because the economy wasn’t working in the way he wanted to. All officials however unanimously 
wanted him to continue. This important news was paired with another message accompanied by a 
newspaper cut-out about Nyerere saying that minimum wage can only be raised at higher 
productivity at that the country capped its taxation maximum, therefore again referencing this 
potential problem. As expected from the ambassador by the ministry, he sent updates on all 
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mutations in government staff and policy changes, also speculating on why these were issued and 
what implications they would hold.199 
A final important document is a sent issue of Africa confidential. It comments on a reshuffle of 
Nyerere’s government, because he wanted more authorities on a rural level (to move away from 
colonial structure).200 This was sent to the ministry to give insight in the new ministers that were 
appointed by Nyerere.201 The writer believed Tanzania needed pragmatism, which in fact was 
something they would drift away from in these years. The writer believes that the measures of the 
acquisition of properties act (if people cannot make profit out of renting a house then this way of 
labour less acquisition of money would disappear) scared away foreign expertise and investment. 202  
The writer also accuses Tanzania of using an ‘everyone is an enemy against us’ rhetoric even when 
the country has many allies and little enemies in reality. The paper in addition also warns about the 
economy and national reserves making a hit, a negative balance during a time where export is 
highest and smuggling.  
The final file is a big folder containing all the general year reports about all the developments and 
changes in the Tanzanian nation that the employees at the embassy wrote, and the correspondence 
the ambassador had with the ministry about them.203 These reports are honest and sometimes quite 
critical, in particular of Nyerere’s officials. The president himself is however described and pictured 
as a wise and capable leader in all the reports, being calm, modest and self-critical. These reports 
contain much information and provided a clear overview on the state of the African country to the 
ministry of Foreign Affairs in the Netherlands. These reports and letters were not openly accessible at 
the time, but most evidence so far has pointed towards the fact that these reports and efforts by the 
embassy were not used a lot to actually create policy by the Dutch ministry. Every now and then a 
letter is sent back from The Hague, briefly saying thanks for the report, or I enjoyed reading it, but 
actual correspondence is usually a one-way street, as what appeared to be the case in all other parts 
of the archive as well. A final bit of proof for this can be found in the correspondence about year 
reports in 1971. In this year the ministry enquired about the year report from that year, mentioning 
that it was submitted too late. The ministry stressed the importance of the report and that they 
would be used frequently in making foreign policy. They however referred to the report in plural, 
stating that reports from all embassies are useful for designing foreign policy in general. This was 
therefore probably not sent because of an extraordinary interest in Tanzania itself. The ambassador 
in response asked for extra assistance, since constructing a report was a heavy burden on top of his 
other work. The ministry apparently took this into account, stating that his situation is 
understandable and the ambassador himself later stated in a letter that he knows that they were 
discussing the matter. Though, after the acknowledgement, the ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed 
in their letter that the ambassador is supposed to do his work in time regardless, referring to the 
standard protocol for receiving the reports. Shortly after the ambassador sent his elaborate report, 
once again without receiving any sort of reply. 
It is clear that the ministry of Foreign Affairs had to deal with many embassies at once. The Tanzanian 
one was but one of over 100 embassies that were active and that they had to converse with. It seems 
reasonable that not every article, letter or document should have been answered or even read 
thoroughly. But it may not be forgotten that Tanzania was one of the most important focus countries 
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for the Dutch development aid, being the biggest recipient of it in whole of sub-Saharan Africa. 
Combining this with the unconventional political doctrines, demographics and economic plans that 
were instated in this country, therefore leads me to believe that correspondence with the embassy 
there would be very important in developing policy for dealing with the African state. In that light, it 
is remarkable to see that the Dutch government have never seemed to take the embassy in account 
when designing their plans for the African state. Multiple parts of the vast archive have shown that 
the ministry has left the opinion of the ambassador out of the equation several times. It is important 
that the restrictions in communication at the time, and the capacity of the ministry to frequently 
communicate about policies should be taken into account before drawing conclusions. At the same 
the discontent from the embassy about the expectations of the ministry and their ways of 
communication was noticeable. Moreover, there is a clear discrepancy between the facts and the 
ideas on how the Dutch government should design its policy regarding Tanzania that were stated the 
reports and letters that were sent from the embassy, and the actual way the ministry dealt with the 
country and its changes. The first factor indicating this are all the combined warnings that were given 
by the ambassador about the economy that were present in multiple parts of the archive. Despite 
the efforts to explain the danger in distorting the national balance of payments by promoting the big 
expenditures that the Tanzanian state did to lead to the imports far exceeding the exports for several 
years. This was particularly worrisome according to the ambassador because several reports had 
shown that Tanzania was already producing a maximum capacity. This advice however seemed to be 
ignored when looking at the policy the ministry applied. Another example of this was the 
correspondence about the misunderstandings about the part of the Dutch budget for development 
aid that was allocated to Tanzania. The Dutch ministry of Foreign Affairs showed no interest changing 
their methods of communication or the ways in which the aid was provided. This was despite firm 
criticism that was voiced by the ambassador. The first time the ministry showed any intention of 
adapting to the political ideals in Tanzania was in 1974, although this was mostly limited to 
prioritising rural development over urban development, which was something the Dutch government 
had always preferred anyway. The inquiries that the ministry did showed a lot about the way the 
ministry dealt with the Tanzanian case in general. Despite regular updates and reports that were 
sent, the ministry decided only to ask for additional information based on an external source, instead 
of any of the reports the embassy sent. The ministry specifically asked for positive news, as they 
were not interested in policy-specific matters about improving the situation, but rather wanted to be 
reassured that their efforts had some sort of effect, and to show they were not wasting money in 
general, on a government that was incapable anyway. This was therefore not an evaluation of what 
effect their own policies had on the country. In doing so the ministry however lost sight of how these 
projects affected the countries development in the long term, at least in the eyes of the embassy. In 
short, this chapter has once again shown that most interest by the Dutch government in Tanzania 
and the development of matters there was marginal and almost a random occurrence. Unfortunately 
documents from later than 1974 have not been released from the archive yet. Further research in 
these documents would be of great help since it would be very interesting and relevant to see if this 
figurative distance remained between the embassy and the ministry, and additionally if they lived up 
to the intention of improving the alignment of Dutch and Tanzanian goals that had to be realised 
with the aid budget. Also, it would be interesting to see what role the embassy would play in this in 
the years after, and how the relations changed when the Dutch government started to become more 
critical of the economic management of the country, in line with the World Bank. With the provided 
information, it can nevertheless be stated that the government and the embassy had very different 
ideas on how the policy should be designed and how it would look like. The seemingly remarkable 
uninterested attitude of the Dutch government in the efforts of the embassy cannot be seen apart 
from the conclusions of the other chapters. Overall it has become clear that the Dutch government 
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expressed generally little interest in the urbanisation policies of Nyerere and their effect on the 
country’s economy, especially considering the importance of the Dutch-Tanzanian relationship that 
had been built in these years.  
3.8 What does this imply? 
Despite the archival matter only being available up to 1974, it is possible to combine the results of 
the two studies to get a comprehensive view on the stance of the Dutch state on the matter. As time 
passed both the papers and the ministry of seemingly unorganised and maybe uninformed changes 
of heart. As the Dutch government did try to adjust its policies, it did not really take the wishes of the 
Tanzanian state into consideration. The newspapers mostly followed the trend of optimism, and the 
Dutch ministry kept doing the same, despite alarming reports. Both were not interested in stories of 
failure and were mostly seeking evidence that the Dutch influence and help were achieving positive 
results. The media strongly seemed to follow the governments approach towards the country, 
applauding its efforts in the beginning whilst never taking Nyerere’s plans entirely seriously. There 
was no belief of either the media or the Dutch state that Tanzania’s leaders would be able to pull of 
creating the society they wanted to see. It was a refreshing face for European states to see a newly 
decolonised African state make these efforts on poverty reduction and the provision of healthcare 
and education for all its citizens, regardless of social status or racial background. This strive was 
therefore monetarily heavily supported by many Western states and institutions, even though 
Tanzania did not align itself with any side in terms of cold war politics. That’s why Western states 
wanted to help Tanzania achieve its goals, only on their own terms. The economic strategy that 
Tanzania wanted to utilise was known to the donors, but not assisted by them. The newspapers give 
enthusiasts for the regime a chance to explain their support in the paper without being criticized. 
Even though forced migration started at some point, the papers chose to turn a blind eye to this, as 
did the Dutch state. Only in retrospect did they start to criticize Nyerere’s deurbanization efforts, 
over a decade after the start of operation Dodoma. Both the media and the ministry therefore share 
an incentive or willingness do dive in depth over the inner workings of the country. Public opinion is 
mostly focussed on the effectiveness in general and not the Tanzanian case specifically despite it 
being receiving such a large portion of the aid budget. The problems with the state (that are in the 
earlier years always presented as obstacles or start-up problems, are also frequently addressed by 
the ambassador in his mail to the ministry. It is therefore justified to say that the Dutch state knew 
about these specific troubles and did not try to actively resolve these problems, preferring to 
continue trying to improve the countries conditions on its own terms. Even though both the Dutch 
papers, Nyerere himself in a Tanzanian newspaper sent by the ambassador and the ambassador 
commented on production capacity having reached its limits, the Dutch government continued to 
pressure the Tanzanian state into buying expensive machinery for industrial production. Besides 
there being virtually no market to sell these manufactured goods to. The problems with the Ujamaa 
economy were known because of both primary and secondary sources, yet no newspaper went into 
depth in analysing why the Dutch government did its approach, or why it differed so much from the 
wishes of the Tanzanian state at the time. When the newspapers started being more critical they 
were mostly concerned with the forced migrations, single party politics of the TANU party and 
poverty or economic decline that had struck the country. It did not seem like the forced migration or 
political system had an impact on the Dutch opinion on Tanzania, as the former was conducted in an 
era when the Dutch government was increasing its aid volume directed to Tanzania and the latter 
was never seen as a problem anyway, according to the sources. What did upset the Netherlands as a 
donor country at some point was the increase in poverty and Tanzania not repaying its debts and 
thereby going against the wishes of the IMF and World Bank? Also the change in view must be seen 
in light of the ongoing Dutch internal political situation at the time. As explained in the first part of 
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this chapter, the Dutch citizens voted for a neoliberal approach towards economics in the 1980’s. 
Even though the volume of aid did not decrease drastically, it partially parted ways from the altruistic 
idealistic approach of the left-wing ministers in the 1970’s. Alongside these changes the public 
opinion on aid and how much it had been benefitting receiving states also slightly altered. The real 
significant change in the Dutch public opinion happened years after Nyerere’s resignation, but 
nevertheless the sources show an increased criticism on how Tanzania was developing after years of 
Dutch monetary assistance. But in general the criticism was geared towards Nyerere, his officials and 
Tanzania and never towards the Dutch ministry and how effective its plans for the Tanzanian state 
proved to be. In this sense both reflection from the media and the ministry itself on the topic appears 
to have been insufficient.  
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Conclusion 
The main question that had to be answered in this thesis was: How did the Netherlands react to the 
economic effects of Julius Nyerere’s Ujamaa policy? To answer this question the thesis has been split 
into two parts. In the first chapter the general economic and political aspirations that came with 
Ujamaa have been explained. In this chapter it has been showcased why Nyerere chose this 
approach, what he tried to achieve with it, and how it has affected the Tanzanian economy during his 
rule. Nyerere in short wanted to create a society were Tanzanians would live in town communities, 
appreciating the values of Christianity and communal African life. They would all contribute to a 
greater nationwide goal of equality and shared production. The need for city life would become 
unnecessary if everyone cooperated in the dreamt system. Combined with a non-aligned diplomatic 
policy, Ujamaa would be a truly defining African alternative to the economic and political systems of 
the world. Its success in Tanzania would be an inspiration for revolutionary movements in Africa and 
as countries would gain independence they would share a joint continentwide identity, economic 
system and goal for society. Putting the theory to practice was however more difficult than expected. 
The voluntary movement away from the city did not happen in the expected way. There may or may 
not have been a factual economic appeal to migrate to a city, but the urban demographic continued 
to grow despite government efforts trying to prevent this. The government was also confronted with 
a reality where the Tanzanians were not willing to move away from the city when Ujamaa villages 
were available. To combat this, the Tanzanian government was forced to create stricter policies to be 
able to migrate the unwilling Tanzanian citizens in the years after the Arusha Declaration. The 
Tanzanian government utilized multiple methods to achieve this goal. All policies were geared 
towards improving the situation in the rural Ujamaa villages, whilst sometimes simultaneously 
neglecting urban areas. The process of decentralization that was started, proved to make living 
conditions in cities worse, while not being able to provide the promised living standards in the newly 
created Ujamaa villages. The government increased its efforts and changed attitude and policy to 
make it easier to (also forcefully) migrate citizens. Local governors were rewarded for creating many 
villages to accelerate this process, as were Tanzanians that voluntarily agreed to move to the 
designated areas.  Methods that the local officials could utilize to move citizens to the Ujamaa 
villages, were for instance moving services and economic activity to rural areas, legislation that 
required Tanzanians to register at local governments and in the worst case forceful migration. As 
stated before, actually providing the removed services to the Ujamaa villages proved to be 
problematic because they had to be built from the ground up for all the villages. In the meantime, 
this lead to poverty and malnourishment for both urban and rural citizens. Tanzania faced having to 
pay for expensive Western urban planners to attempt to achieve its goals that in some cases made 
plans that were not suited to the government’s ideology. This in turn lead to huge outskirts around 
the cities, were Tanzanians resided illegally, whilst often being deprived of many advantages that 
either life in the city center or in a functioning Ujamaa village could have offered. The main 
conclusion from this chapter is that the policy of government officials regarding urbanization as it 
was, was unfortunately both harmful to the well-being of rural and urban residents alike. It 
contributed to a situation where Tanzania became increasingly dependent on foreign assistance and 
aid to realize its goals and feed its population. It leaves the question whether Ujamaa could have 
worked with assistance and cooperation from international institutions and donor states. 
The remarkable conclusion from the second part of this thesis shows that there were big differences 
in priorities and approach between the Tanzanian government and the donors. It turned out that the 
reaction to Tanzania’s plans by the Western world, and the Netherlands specifically was very 
indifferent and metaphorically lukewarm. Despite the Dutch government and ministry of Foreign 
Affairs apparently having a special interest in Tanzania, maintaining strong diplomatic ties and 
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choosing the African nation as a key recipient of aid, chapters 2 and 3 strongly suggest that the Dutch 
government seemed to show limited interest in the nation’s development and politics. In fact, the 
sources portray a ministry trusting its own expertise from the drawing board over the opinion of local 
residents and government officials in Tanzania. The ministry and the Tanzanian government have 
never been able to align their policies throughout the time of development cooperation. The Dutch 
government only started to change its policies when the public opinion turned on Tanzania when it 
couldn’t repay the loans to the multilateral organisations. It was always clear that Tanzania’s 
economy was not working as it should have during Nyerere’s reign. Nevertheless, policies were rarely 
adapted to what was deemed needed or necessary by the Tanzanian government.    
This is shown by the many differences in the way the Tanzanian state wanted to develop its economy 
and rural areas compared to how the Dutch wanted to provide their aid to make this happen. 
Nyerere’s intentions to develop the rural sites were in theory appreciated, but in practice the 
majority Dutch of aid policy was reserved for assistance in large scale production and industrial 
assistance in Dar es Salam. This obviously was a polar opposite to what the Tanzanian government 
wanted to prioritize. Aside from these differences, why the Netherlands provided up to 8% of all aid 
for the country by itself is hard to explain in general. A reason could be that the ministry of Foreign 
Affairs was incredibly satisfied with Tanzania’s international policy and respect its respect for human 
rights. Since Tanzania’s officials sometimes disregarded these rights in enthusiasm for the cause or 
payment this argument remains somewhat wobbly. It is however clear the Dutch did not maintain 
their heavy financial assistance on the premise of economic ideals. The Dutch projects and policies in 
Tanzania usually appeared to clash with the ideological wishes of Nyerere and the government. The 
material in the chapter showcased several discrepancies between Dutch and Tanzanian policy. The 
Dutch government was aware of this throughout these years, evaluating that the approaches of both 
country should be aligned better. In reality however, the sources have shown that this never really 
happened, and in 2004 the evaluation verdict still brought up this problem, almost 40 years after 
Nyerere proposed his ideas. Especially the focus on the urban centres and industrial production 
made it seem like the Dutch ministry did not take Tanzania’s deurbanization efforts into account. 
They condoned Nyerere’s efforts to shape his Ujamaa society, but did not alter their policies and 
projects enough to work with this. The only real changes were as said brought on when the 
multilateral organisations started having problems with Tanzania. The Netherlands preferred to 
follow the line of policy that the World Bank and the IMF upheld, and therefore agreed with their 
criticism. Economic deterioration caused by Ujamaa and its deurbanization has only lightly changed 
the way the Dutch approached the issue of development aid for the country. The most noteworthy 
change is that the Dutch lowered the amount of aid that was given when Tanzania was facing its 
toughest economic times and reforms, and that the ministry tried to enlarge its influence on the 
countries macro-economic policy in this era. That this would bring the Tanzanian state even closer to 
the brink of implosion when it became increasingly difficult to provide services for its rural 
population, was only realised after many existing structures and services had broken down, and life 
expectancy, access to clean water, food security and literacy rates had dropped. The Netherlands 
was a generous donor for aid to Tanzania, but it was rarely able to put this money to use for the long 
term for the Tanzanian government.  
Dutch newspapers show an uncanny parallel to the ministry’s aid policy with the country. The 
general lack of attention and evaluation, the fascination with the concept of Ujamaa when it was 
paid attention to and the sudden change in attitude from being supportive to heavily critical of 
Tanzania’s economic policy and human rights situation after signs of this had been visible for years. 
Ujamaa was not mentioned often, and reports on Nyerere’s grand deurbanization scheme were a 
very rare sight. Not a single writer has raised questions about the ineffective relationship between 
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the Netherlands and its favourite sub-Saharan recipient of aid. It is however clearly noticeable that 
the overall tone and content of the articles drastically changed over 25 years. The opinion of the 
newspapers changed with the world banks view of Tanzania alongside with the general discontent 
about development aid in general in the public opinion. This turning point can be found at the end of 
the 1970’s. The first articles were not blind to Ujamaa’s systematic flaws and problems, but praised 
the Tanzanian president’s efforts to help the poor and battle corruption. The remarkable difference 
is that after the 1980’s Nyerere is pictured by multiple newspapers as a cruel dictator, whose flawed 
ideas on economics led to misery and poverty. This might be done to create an interesting story one 
way or the other, but it stands out as interesting either way, especially because the divide is so clear 
in the sense of time. This shows in the way the writers inform on the deurbanization policies and 
their effects. They either pick a positive approach, saying that Nyerere ensures that his people can 
move in the tempo they want to, or picturing Tanzania’s government as a repressive, dictatorial 
force. There seems to be no middle ground. All but one positive article possess no criticism 
whatsoever on this, whilst the negative articles make it seem like all Tanzanians were forcefully 
shipped and sent all around the country. This criticism is more peculiar considering that most of the 
involuntary movements had been done years before, ironically at a time when the Dutch news on 
the matter was always positive. The sudden need to showcase this, whilst the knowledge was 
available long beforehand, suggest strongly that the writers used this fact to enlarge the negative 
image of the countries policies and Julius Nyerere. Since all articles were supposed to be informative, 
this divide seems all the more illogical. The Dutch journalists act the same as the multilateral 
organisations and the Dutch government regarding Tanzania. For years repressive policies, poor 
economic efforts and mismanagement are tolerated or ignored despite significant sums of money 
being sent in that direction with poor results as shown in chapter 2. The reason for this radical 
change of heart remains as vague as in the last chapter. It feels like the Netherlands and the 
international community were reacting very slowly to the changes in Tanzanian politics, economy 
and society. There is however no reason why they would do so, which doesn’t resolve the problem. 
Maybe the answer is that opportunism and group think are the actual factors that influenced the 
political and public discourse regarding the country.   
The last chapter furthermore potentially held the most interesting documents and therefore 
answers, but unfortunately the archive only contains material until the first half of the 1970’s. 
Regarding these years the results of studying the correspondence between the embassy and the 
ministry do however line up with the general conclusions of the other research in the second part of 
the thesis. The answer that the sources show is that the correspondence is probably very 
representative of the Dutch attitude towards the country and its Ujamaa policies in general. The 
unconventional way in which the African nation was governed and especially organised would lead 
one to believe that it would be wise to take actual witnesses of the results of the government’s 
policies and efforts into account when designing the development policy for Tanzania for which the 
available amount of aid would be used. But as shown in the last chapter the ministry struggled to 
incorporate signals from Tanzania into the policy. Multiple parts of the vast archive have also shown 
that the ministry has left the opinion of the ambassador and thereby the Tanzanian government out 
of the equation several times. The embassy repeatedly voiced its concerns about the expectations of 
the ministry and their somewhat lacklustre ways of communication. The ambassador felt like he was 
left out of discussions too much in general, and addressed this in his letters as well. These remarks 
were however never answered, let alone considered by the ministry. The information from the 
reports and letters from the embassy was not reflected in the type of policy that the Dutch 
government designed. Despite the ambassadors repeated warnings and explanations about the 
danger in distorting the national balance of payments by promoting the big expenditures, the Dutch 
encouraged imports far exceeding the exports for several years. The fact that Tanzania was already 
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producing a maximum capacity was also ignored. Several other examples like the correspondence 
about the misunderstandings about the part of the Dutch budget for development for Tanzania and 
the disagreement on in what form the money should be spent provide more evidence for the case 
that the Dutch ministry expressed little interest in the Tanzanian situation. It is wise to be careful to 
avoid drawing hasty or too generalising conclusions on the matter, but the (lack of) discussion and 
correspondence seems to be fitting with the other chapters. Overall the attitude of the Dutch 
ministry seems to be distant and uninterested in the opinions of people outside of its own employees 
in the Netherlands. Despite regular updates and reports that were sent from the embassy, the 
ministry only asked for additional information based on an external source, instead of any of the 
reports the embassy sent. In general, most interest by the Dutch government in Tanzania and the 
development of matters there was based on either protocol or random occurrences like that. The 
ministry knew all about operation Dodoma, economic struggles following Ujamaa and deteriorating 
conditions, and they decided to partially ignore it. It would be very interesting and relevant to see if 
this figurative distance remained between the embassy and the ministry, and also if their indifferent 
attitude would change to dissatisfaction when international criticism for the country grew. With the 
provided information, it can nevertheless be stated that the government and the embassy had very 
different ideas on how the policy should be designed and how it would look like. Overall, considering 
the intensive financial relation that both nations shared, it seems at least peculiar how limited the 
alignment of policy, communication, goals and ideology was between the countries. It would be too 
extreme and much too generalising to say the Dutch government disregarded the Tanzanian 
developments completely. From an outside perspective, looking at the source material does however 
suggest that the Dutch government, especially keeping in mind how much money it had made 
available for Tanzania, was not able to put in the effort to react adequately and effectively to the 
situation in Nyerere’s country. The alignment of the aid policy and media opinions with the stance of 
the IMF and the World Bank shows that the Dutch government put more trust in these organisations 
rather than using its own information resources in Tanzania, namely their embassy and the 
Tanzanian officials. So, to answer the main research question: ‘‘How did Julius Nyerere’s 
deurbanization efforts affect the Tanzanian economy and how did the Netherlands react to this?’ in 
short: Nyerere’s government tried to influence the Tanzanians to move to designated villages by 
various means, but in the process production dropped and expenditures made Tanzania increasingly 
dependent on foreign aid. Tanzania had to seek help from foreign donors to complete its goals and 
reached out to ask for specific support. The unexpected and somewhat blunt answer to the second 
part of the question is that the Netherlands frankly did not really react to this fact in general. The 
sources have shown that the Netherlands built its own policies to execute in Tanzania from the 
drawing board and preferred to operate alone and to its own ideas. The attitude only changed in the 
1980’s when the international community and multilateral organisations turned on Tanzania, after 
the country had been obstructing its own economy and development for years with relatively little 
concern or response. Further research may provide clearer answers to as why the shift in attitude 
specifically started at the time it did. The black and white approach of glossing over big problems, 
and suddenly emphasising those years afterward might be explained to a greater extent after the 
further research has been done and after more recent documents have been made available in the 
national archive. For now, it can however be said that negative results of Nyerere’s deurbanization 
policies, only saw Dutch response after most of the damage had been done already. The figurative 
and literal distance always left the international community and thereby particularly the Netherlands 
one step behind. 
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